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Abstract
We present an approach to analyze learning outcomes in a broad class of misspec-
ified environments, spanning both single-agent and social learning. We introduce a
novel “prediction accuracy” order over subjective models, and observe that this makes
it possible to partially restore standard martingale convergence arguments that apply
under correctly specified learning. Based on this, we derive general conditions to de-
termine when beliefs in a given environment converge to some long-run belief either
locally or globally (i.e., from some or all initial beliefs). We show that these conditions
can be applied, first, to unify and generalize various convergence results in previously
studied settings. Second, they enable us to analyze environments where learning is
“slow,” such as costly information acquisition and sequential social learning. In such
environments, we illustrate that even if agents learn the truth when they are correctly
specified, vanishingly small amounts of misspecification can generate extreme failures
of learning.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation and overview
Motivated in part by empirical evidence that individuals face numerous systematic cognitive
biases and limitations, a growing literature recognizes the need to enrich classic economic
models of single-agent and social learning by allowing for the possibility that agents may hold
an incorrect, simplified or, for short, misspecified view of the data generating process. Many
papers have demonstrated how various forms of misspecification alter learning outcomes in
a wide range of economic applications, from learning about the return to effort by a worker
who is overconfident in her ability, to social learning about the quality of a new product by
consumers who are incorrect about others’ preferences.
Learning dynamics of such models tend to be non-trivial to analyze. A primary reason
is that when agents are misspecified, their belief (i.e., posterior ratio) process is no longer
a martingale (with respect to the true data generating process), so standard convergence
arguments do not apply. The analysis is further complicated by the fact that in most afore-
mentioned settings information depends endogenously on agents’ actions, and hence may
be influenced by their misspecification.1 As a result, much existing work has derived learn-
ing outcomes using approaches tailored specifically to each application, while only recently
the focus has turned to developing general tools to analyze the asymptotics of misspecified
learning dynamics (see Section 1.2 for a discussion of related literature).
This paper contributes to the latter goal by presenting an approach to analyze learning
outcomes in a broad class of misspecified environments, spanning both single-agent and
social learning. We introduce novel “prediction accuracy” orderings over subjective models
that allow one to partially restore the standard martingale convergence method. Based on
this, we derive general conditions to determine when beliefs in a given environment converge
to some long-run belief either locally or globally (i.e., from some or all initial beliefs). We
show that these conditions can be applied, first, to unify and generalize various convergence
results in previously studied settings. Second, they enable us to analyze a natural class of
environments, including costly information acquisition and sequential social learning, where
learning is “slow.” In such environments, we illustrate that even if agents learn the truth
when they are correctly specified, vanishingly small amounts of misspecification can generate
extreme failures of learning.
To nest a wide range of applications and make the logic of belief convergence transparent,
Section 3 sets up an abstract environment, where agents, actions, and preferences are not
1This contrasts with a literature in statistics that studies learning by a passive observer who receives
exogenous signals about which he is misspecified (e.g., Berk, 1966).
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explicitly modeled. Instead, we consider a belief process µt over some set of states of the
world, which from any initial belief µ0 evolves in the following manner. Each period t =
0, 1, . . ., a signal zt is drawn according to a true signal distribution Pµt(·) that—capturing
endogeneity of signals—may depend on the current belief µt. Following the realization of zt,
belief µt is updated to µt+1 via Bayes’ rule based on the perception that the signal distribution
at each state ω and belief µt is P̂µt(·|ω). Capturing potential misspecification, the true signal
distribution need not coincide with any of the perceived distributions. Section 2 provides
three illustrative economic examples.
Section 4 analyzes belief convergence. We begin by introducing an order over states that
compares how well they predict the true signal distribution at any given belief: For any
q > 0, we say that state ω q-dominates state ω′ at belief µ if the perceived signal distribu-
tion P̂µ(·|ω) in state ω comes “closer” to the true distribution Pµ(·) than does the perceived
distribution P̂µ(·|ω′) in state ω′. Here closeness is measured using the moment-generating
function (evaluated at q) of the perceived log-likelihood ratio of states. This order refines
the usual comparison based on Kullback-Leibler divergence, which features prominently in
existing analyses of misspecified learning. A simple but key observation is that, throughout
any range of beliefs where q-dominance obtains, the qth power of the posterior ratio process
becomes a nonnegative supermartingale. This allows one to locally restore standard martin-
gale convergence arguments from the correctly specified setting, providing a useful approach
to analyze asymptotic beliefs.
Building on this observation, we derive conditions that ensure that a given point-mass
belief δω is (i) locally stable, (ii) globally stable, or (iii) unstable, in the sense that the belief
process µt converges to δω either (i) from any initial belief that is sufficiently close to δω, or
(ii) from all initial full-support beliefs, or (iii) escapes any small enough neighborhood of δω.
By applying the above martingale observation, Theorem 1 shows that δω is locally stable
if state ω strictly q-dominates all other states ω′ at all beliefs µ in a neighborhood of δω,
except possibly at the belief µ = δω. We provide an analogous condition for instability. The
fact that these conditions do not impose q-dominance at the point-mass belief δω is essential
to analyzing environments with slow learning, a property we explain below.
Using martingale arguments, we also obtain two conditions for global stability that
strengthen the local stability criterion in Theorem 1 in complementary ways. Theorem 2
shows that δω is globally stable if state ω uniquely survives the iterated elimination of (glob-
ally) strictly dominated states. Proposition 1 restricts the prediction accuracy ranking only
near point-mass beliefs, but imposes more structure on how states are ordered.
Section 5 applies the preceding stability results to two classes of economic applications.
Section 5.1 considers single-agent active learning in rich one-dimensional state spaces, as
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in many important applications in the literature. We show that the iterated elimination
criterion in Theorem 2 is straightforward to verify in this setting and can be used to unify and
generalize convergence results in applications such as monopoly pricing with a misspecified
demand curve (Example 1), effort choice by an overconfident agent (Heidhues, Kőszegi, and
Strack, 2018), and optimal stopping under the gambler’s fallacy (He, 2018).
Section 5.2 studies environments that feature slow learning: That is, as agents grow
confident in any state, their behavior generates less and less informative new signals, so
the speed of belief convergence vanishes near point-mass beliefs. This is a well-known prop-
erty of several important economic applications, including costly information acquisition and
sequential social learning (Examples 2 and 3). However, existing approaches to analyze learn-
ing outcomes under misspecification do not in general apply to such settings. By applying
our stability results, we illustrate that slow learning can lead to fragility against misspeci-
fication: In particular, even if agents learn the true state when they are correctly specified,
vanishingly small amounts of misspecification can generate extreme failures of learning.
1.2 Related literature
Our paper builds on Esponda and Pouzo (2016), who define a general steady-state notion
for misspecified learning dynamics, Berk-Nash equilibrium, nesting other influential steady-
state concepts that capture more specific forms of misspecification (e.g., Eyster and Rabin,
2005; Jehiel, 2005; Esponda, 2008; Spiegler, 2016). While it is known that any locally stable
belief is a Berk-Nash equilibrium (Lemma 1 establishes this in our setting), the converse
is typically not the case. We provide stability criteria that determine which Berk-Nash
equilibria learning dynamics in a given environment converge to locally or globally. We also
point to natural settings where the set of stable equilibria is not robust to the details of
agents’ misspecification. Our martingale approach relies on measuring prediction accuracy
using q-dominance, which refines the measure based on Kullback-Leibler divergence that
underlies Berk-Nash equilibrium.
Several important earlier papers have examined the convergence of misspecified learning
dynamics in a variety of single-agent (e.g., Nyarko, 1991; Schwartzstein, 2014; Fudenberg,
Romanyuk, and Strack, 2017; Heidhues, Kőszegi, and Strack, 2018; He, 2018; Bushong and
Gagnon-Bartsch, 2019; Cong, 2019; Heidhues, Kőszegi, and Strack, 2021) and social learning
settings (e.g., Eyster and Rabin, 2010; Bohren, 2016; Gagnon-Bartsch, 2017; Bohren, Imas,
and Rosenberg, 2019). The approaches in these papers are either tailored to particular
environments and forms of misspecification or apply in more general settings but rely on
specific parametric assumptions (e.g., Gaussian signals in Fudenberg, Romanyuk, and Strack,
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2017; Heidhues, Kőszegi, and Strack, 2021).
Our paper contributes to a recent focus in the literature on developing more unified ap-
proaches to establish convergence under misspecified learning. Bohren and Hauser (2021)
provide general conditions for local and global stability of beliefs in binary-state environ-
ments. A key challenge they address is to allow for heterogeneous models across different
agents (as is natural under social learning), which is not our focus in this paper.2 Instead,
relying on our martingale approach, we derive results that apply to rich state spaces (e.g.,
Section 5.1) and environments with slow learning (e.g., Section 5.2). In settings that do not
feature slow learning, Bohren and Hauser (2021) show that successful learning is robust to
small amounts of misspecification; complementary to this, Section 5.2 sheds light on ways
in which slow learning can lead to fragility against misspecification.
In general-state environments, Esponda, Pouzo, and Yamamoto (2021) and Fudenberg,
Lanzani, and Strack (2021) consider single-agent learning with finite actions. Esponda,
Pouzo, and Yamamoto (2021) develop a general method to analyze asymptotic action fre-
quencies, which they show can be approximated by a differential inclusion.3 Fudenberg,
Lanzani, and Strack (2021) provide a detailed analysis of the case where the agent max-
imizes exponentially discounted payoffs. They derive tight conditions for convergence in
terms of the agent’s payoff function, by building on the martingale approach we introduce in
this paper. In contrast with both these papers, we present results that also apply to social
learning and to settings that feature slow learning.
Some environments in the literature are not nested by the current framework, notably
models with intertemporally correlated signals and social learning settings with private action
observations.4 The latter includes our previous paper, Frick, Iijima, and Ishii (2020a), which,
similar to Example 3, highlights the fragility of social learning against misspecification about
others’ preferences. As we discuss (Section 5.2.3), the logic and nature of this fragility result
differs from the current paper, as the setting in Frick, Iijima, and Ishii (2020a) does not
display slow learning.
2 Illustrative examples
To illustrate the scope of applicability of our approach, we present three economic examples.
The first is an example of single-agent active learning under rich one-dimensional states, the
2Some of our results can be extended to heterogeneous models; see Appendix G of the previous version
Frick, Iijima, and Ishii (2020b).
3Murooka and Yamamoto (2021) extend to settings with infinite actions or strategic externalities.
4See, e.g., Rabin (2002); Ortoleva and Snowberg (2015); Esponda and Pouzo (2019); Molavi (2019); Cho
and Kasa (2017) for the former, and Dasaratha and He (2020); Levy and Razin (2018) for the latter.
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setting we analyze in Section 5.1:
Example 1 (Monopoly pricing). Consider a monopolist who is learning about his demand
function. Each period t = 0, 1, . . ., the monopolist first sets a price at, and then faces demand
ω∗− βat + εt where εt is a mean-zero noise term with a log-concave and full-support density
on R. The intercept of demand (“state”) ω∗ ∈ Ω = [ω, ω] ⊆ R+ is unknown to the monopolist,
who has a full-support prior µ0 ∈ ∆(Ω). Upon observing period-t demand, the monopolist
updates his belief to µt+1. However, in so doing, the monopolist misperceives the slope of
demand β to be β̂, where β, β̂ > 0. The monopolist myopically maximizes expected revenue











By applying our results, we will show that, from any prior, the monopolist’s belief converges




the property that at belief δω̂, the monopolist’s perception of average demand, ω̂ − β̂a(δω̂),
equals the true average demand, ω∗ − βa(δω̂). In contrast with Esponda and Pouzo (2016)
and Heidhues, Kőszegi, and Strack (2021), who establish analogous results using stochastic
approximation arguments that rely on beliefs being Gaussian, our approach does not require
any parametric assumptions. N
The next two examples, to which we return in Section 5.2, feature slow learning and
illustrate how this can generate fragility against misspecification:
Example 2 (Costly information acquisition). Consider an agent who learns about some
fixed and unknown state (e.g., her ability) by acquiring costly information (e.g., seeking out
expert feedback). The true state is ω∗ ∈ Ω, for some finite Ω ⊆ R+, and the agent has a
full-support prior µ0 ∈ ∆(Ω). Each period t = 0, 1, . . ., the agent observes the realization of
a signal zt that is 1 (“good news”) with some probability β+γtω∗ ∈ (0, 1) and 0 (“bad news”)
with complementary probability. Here β is the state-independent base rate of the high signal
over which the agent has no control, and γt ∈ [0, γ] is a precision parameter that the agent
chooses at cost C(γt). Upon observing the realized signal zt, the agent updates her belief to
µt+1. However, in so doing, she misperceives the base rate β to be β̂. For example, if β̂ < β,
this implies a form of “ego-biased” belief-updating, where the agent overreacts to good news
about her ability but underreacts to bad news (e.g., Eil and Rao, 2011; Mobius, Niederle,
Niehaus, and Rosenblat, 2014).
Note that true and perceived signal distributions are (Blackwell-)more informative the
greater γt and are uninformative when γt = 0. We assume the agent has positive value to
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information, as captured by a utility v : ∆(Ω) → R that is continuous and strictly convex
in her current belief.5 Each period, she chooses γt as a function of her current belief µt to
myopically maximize expected utility net of the cost. That is,
γt = γ(µt) ∈ argmax
γ∈[0,γ]
Êµt [v(µt+1(γ))]− C(γ), (2)
where µt+1(γ) denotes the agent’s random posterior following period-t signal realizations and
the agent’s expectation Êµt is with respect to her perceived signal distribution.
In Section 5.2.1, we first note that if information is costless (C is constant), the agent’s
belief converges almost surely to a point-mass on the true state whenever β̂ is sufficiently
close to β. By contrast, if information is costly (C is strictly increasing), successful learning
is highly fragile against misspecification: Suppose the agent learns the true state whenever
she is correctly specified (β̂ = β). If β̂ < β (resp. β̂ > β), we show that, from any prior,
her belief converges almost surely to a point-mass on the highest (resp. lowest) state in Ω,
regardless of the true state ω∗. Thus, in the presence of costless feedback, a small propensity
for ego-biased interpretation of signals does not prevent the agent from learning her ability.
But if obtaining feedback requires just a slight amount of effort, then even arbitrarily small
amounts of this bias may be greatly amplified over time and lead to drastic overconfidence
in the long run. As we discuss, the reason is that costly information acquisition leads to
slow learning: As the agent becomes increasingly confident in any given state, she chooses
to acquire less and less precise signals, because her value to information vanishes. N
Example 3 (Sequential social learning). Consider social learning by a sequence of het-
erogeneous agents. There is a fixed and unknown state (e.g., the safety of a new product),
ω∗ ∈ Ω for some finite Ω ⊆ R. Each period t = 0, 1, . . ., agent t chooses a one-shot action
zt ∈ {0, 1} (e.g., whether or not to adopt the product) after observing a private signal st ∈ R
about ω∗ and the public sequence (z0, . . . , zt−1) of predecessors’ actions. Agents have private
preference types θt ∈ R (e.g., risk attitudes), which are drawn independently across agents,
states, and signals according to a cdf F . Starting with some full-support common prior
µ0 ∈ ∆(Ω), agent t chooses zt to maximize her expected utility
Eµt [u(zt, θt, ω)|θt, st],
where µt denotes the Bayesian update of µ0 based solely on the public action sequence
(z0, . . . , zt−1). However, in updating beliefs to µt, we assume that all agents misperceive the
5For example, suppose that v(µ) = maxa∈R Eµ[−(a− ω)2] is the indirect utility to a prediction problem
that the agent must solve at the end of each period (where realized payoffs are not observed until some
exogenously distributed stopping time).
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type distribution F in the population to be some cdf F̂ .
Under standard monotonicity and richness assumptions, Section 5.2.1 first notes that
agents learn the true state when they are correctly specified (F̂ = F ). However, by applying
our results, we classify learning outcomes when F̂ 6= F , and show that successful learning is
again highly fragile. For example, when agents even slightly underestimate (resp. overesti-
mate) the extent of risk tolerance in the population, their beliefs converge almost surely to
a point-mass on the highest (resp. lowest) safety level, no matter the true safety level ω∗;
and when agents underestimate the heterogeneity of risk attitudes, their beliefs may fail to
converge and cycle between different safety levels. The source of this fragility is that a well-
known feature of social learning again implies slow learning: As previous action sequences
become increasingly indicative of any particular state, agents put less and less weight on their
private signals, so that new action observations become increasingly uninformative. N
3 Model
3.1 Setup
We conduct our general analysis in the following abstract environment, where agents, actions,
and preferences are not explicitly modeled. This allows us to simultaneously nest a variety of
single-agent and social learning models and makes the logic of belief convergence transparent.
For any topological space X, we endow X with its Borel σ-algebra and let ∆(X) denote the
space of Borel probability measures on X.
There is a set of states Ω. For the analysis in the main text, we assume that Ω is
finite; Appendix B provides results for infinite state spaces. At the beginning of each period
t = 0, 1, . . ., there is a belief µt ∈ ∆(Ω) ⊆ R|Ω|. The initial belief µ0 is exogenous and has
full support.6 The evolution of beliefs is determined as follows: At the end of each period
t, a signal zt from a topological space Z is drawn according to Pµt(·), where Pµ(·) ∈ ∆(Z)
denotes the true signal distribution at current belief µ. After signal zt realizes, belief
µt is updated to µt+1 via Bayes’ rule according to a collection of conditional perceived
signal distributions : Specifically, at each current belief µ, the perceived signal distribution
conditional on state ω is P̂µ(·|ω) ∈ ∆(Z). We assume that, for each ω and µ, Pµ(·) and P̂µ(·|ω)
admit continuous Radon-Nikodym derivatives pµ(·) and p̂µ(·|ω) with respect to some σ-finite
measure ν on Z; as usual, when Z is finite (resp. Z = R), we take ν to be the counting (resp.
6The full-support assumption is without loss; if µ0 assigns zero probability to some states, the same
analysis and results below apply up to eliminating those states from Ω.
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, ∀ω ∈ Ω.
By allowing the true and perceived signal distributions to depend on the current belief,
the model can nest applications where signals depend endogenously on agents’ actions, which
depend on their current beliefs; see Remark 1.7 Capturing possible misspecification, the true
signal distribution need not coincide with any of the perceived signal distributions. We
refer to the case where for some true state ω∗, Pµ(·) = P̂µ(·|ω∗) for all µ, as the correctly
specified benchmark.8 Throughout, we impose the following regularity assumption:
Assumption 1.
1. (Absolute continuity). For each ω ∈ Ω and µ ∈ ∆(Ω), suppPµ(·) ⊆ suppP̂µ(·|ω).
2. (Well-behaved likelihood ratios). There exist a measurable function ` : Z → R+ and











3. (Belief continuity near point-mass beliefs). For each ω ∈ Ω, there is a neighborhood
B 3 δω such that for all ω′ ∈ Ω, µ ∈ B and z ∈ Z with pµ(z) > 0, we have that pµ(z)
and p̂µ(z|ω′) are continuous in µ.
Assumption 1.1 is standard in the literature and rules out belief-updating after signals
that are perceived to realize with zero probability. The remaining assumptions are technical
conditions that are satisfied in most applications in the literature: Assumption 1.2 is a reg-
ularity condition on the integrability of perceived likelihood ratios, which will be important
for our martingale approach based on moment generating functions.9 Assumption 1.3 en-
sures that, near point-mass beliefs, signal densities are continuous in beliefs; this simplifies
the statements of our stability results.
Remark 1. We illustrate how two leading classes of applications map into this model.
Single-agent active learning: Each period, the agent chooses an action a(µ) from a
(discrete or continuous) space A as a function of her current belief µ; for example, such a
Markovian policy results from maximizing discounted expected payoffs. Each action choice
7The dependence of perceived signal distributions on µ can also capture certain belief-dependent depar-
tures from Bayesian updating, e.g., confirmation bias.
8Correct specification is defined only in terms of signals, as this abstract setting does not feature payoffs.
9The condition rules out that the distribution of perceived log-likelihood ratios log p̂µ(z|ω)p̂µ(z|ω′) , when z is
drawn from Pµ, is heavy-tailed (i.e., the moment-generating function is infinite at all non-zero arguments).
Commonly used parametric distributions (e.g., Gaussian) are not heavy-tailed.
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a induces a true signal distribution Ga(·) ∈ ∆(Z), but the agent updates beliefs based on
perceived signal distributions Ĝa(·|ω) ∈ ∆(Z). This maps to the current model by setting
Pµ(·) = Ga(µ)(·) and P̂µ(·|ω) = Ĝa(µ)(·|ω). The above assumptions on P, P̂ translate into
assumptions on G, Ĝ, and a(·) in a straightforward manner.10
Example 1 is a special case of this setting, where actions correspond to the monopolist’s
price choice a(µ) given by (1) and signals to demand realizations. In Example 2, actions
correspond to the precision choice γ(µ) given by (2) and signals to good or bad news. In
both examples, true signal distributions depend on some fixed true state ω∗. While these
examples feature misspecification in the form of a dogmatic belief in a particular parameter
β̂, misspecification in the general model can take the form of a prior belief over a set of
parameters that does not include the true parameter.
Social learning: Under sequential social learning, signal zt corresponds to agent t’s
action and µt represents the public belief that is based only on the history (z0, . . . , zt−1) of
past actions. Given µt and state ω, zt is stochastic due to the random realization of agent
t’s type θt and private signal st. Specifically, in the binary action setting of Example 3, the
true and perceived probabilities of action 0 satisfy
pµt(0|ω∗) =
ˆ
F (θ∗(µst))φ(s|ω∗) ds, p̂µt(0|ω) =
ˆ
F̂ (θ∗(µst))φ(s|ω) ds,
where φ(·|ω) is the density of private signals in state ω, µst ∈ ∆(Ω) denotes the Bayesian up-
date of µt following private signal realization s, and θ∗(ν) denotes the type who is indifferent
between actions 0 and 1 at belief ν.11
More generally, the model nests any social learning environment in which agents’ actions
are Markovian in a public belief, including learning from market prices (e.g., Vives, 1993) or
strategic experimentation (e.g., Bolton and Harris, 1999). N
3.2 Stability notions
Given any true and perceived signal distributions and initial belief µ0, our model generates a
Markov process over beliefs. Let Pµ denote the induced probability measure over sequences
of beliefs (µt) with µ0 = µ. We seek to analyze which states ω long-run beliefs can grow
confident in, in the sense that process µt converges to the point-mass belief δω either locally or
globally as a function of initial beliefs. Formally, we consider the following stability notions:
10For example, Assumption 1.3 holds if a(·) is continuous in µ near point-mass beliefs and Ga, Ĝa(·|ω)
admit densities that are continuous in a. The formulation also allows A to be a set of mixed actions. In this
case, we treat Z as the product space of realized signals and actions.
11The assumptions we impose in Section 5.2.2 ensure that θ∗(ν) exists and is unique for each ν, and that
agent t takes action 0 following private signal s if and only if θt < θ∗(µst ).
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Definition 1. Consider any ω ∈ Ω. Belief δω is:
1. locally stable if for any γ < 1, there exists a neighborhood B 3 δω such that Pµ[µt →
δω] ≥ γ for each initial belief µ ∈ B;
2. globally stable if Pµ[µt → δω] = 1 for each initial belief µ;
3. unstable if there exists a neighborhood B 3 δω such that Pµ[∃t, µt 6∈ B] = 1 for each
initial belief µ ∈ B.
Local stability requires that beliefs converge with positive probability to δω from any
initial belief in some open set B around δω, where the probability of converging to δω can
be made arbitrarily close to 1 as long as B is small enough. More strongly, global stability
requires that beliefs converge to δω with probability 1 from any initial belief (recall that
initial beliefs are assumed full-support). By contrast, δω is unstable if starting from any
initial belief µ in some small enough neighborhood B of δω, beliefs eventually escape B with
probability 1. Clearly, if δω is unstable, it is not locally stable.
By focusing on the stability/instability of point-mass beliefs δω, we do not analyze when
long-run beliefs are mixed, i.e., assign positive probability to multiple states. Long-run
beliefs are never mixed in environments that satisfy an identification condition, whereby at
any mixed µ, there is a possible signal realization that leads beliefs to update in favor of
one state in the support of µ rather than some other state (see Lemma 10 in Appendix A
for the formal statement). This condition is satisfied in most existing settings studied in the
misspecified learning literature, including all applications in this paper.12
3.3 Berk-Nash equilibrium and slow learning
A necessary condition for stability has been proposed by Esponda and Pouzo (2016). For
any P, P̂ ∈ ∆(Z) with densities p, p̂, define the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence of




dP (z).13 When signals are drawn repeatedly
according to the distribution P , this measures how close P̂ comes to predicting the long-run
signal distribution, by considering the expected log-likelihood ratio of signals between P and
P̂ . Adapting Esponda and Pouzo (2016) to our setting, given any true and perceived signal
12Under correctly specified learning, several papers consider environments that violate this condition, for
example some active learning settings where agents stop observing informative signals at some mixed be-
lief (e.g., McLennan, 1984, bandit problems, or costly learning environments that violate the condition in
Lemma 6), and social learning settings that feature herding or confounded learning (Bikhchandani, Hirsh-
leifer, and Welch, 1992; Banerjee, 1992; Smith and Sørensen, 2000).
13We use the convention that 00 = 0,
1
0 =∞, 0 log 0 = 0, and log∞ =∞.
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Condition (3) is a fixed-point requirement, which says that at belief δω, the perceived sig-
nal distribution that comes closest to the true signal distribution Pδω(·) is the distribution
P̂δω(·|ω) in state ω. Thus, if beliefs converge to δω, then state ω itself best predicts the in-
duced long-run signal distribution. Analogous to Esponda and Pouzo (2016), we show that
this is a necessary condition for δω to be locally stable:14
Lemma 1. If δω is not a BeNE, then δω is unstable.
While condition (3) is necessary for local stability, it is not in general sufficient, as many
environments feature multiple BeNE, some of which are stable while others are unstable.
Thus, our sufficient conditions for stability will take the form of refinements of BeNE.
A class of environments with a particularly stark multiplicity of BeNE is the following.






That is, the (perceived) information content of each signal z vanishes as the belief µ grows











p̂µ(z|ω′′) dPµt(z), vanishes as beliefs µt approach any
point-mass belief δω, capturing the sense in which learning is slow. Under Assumption 1,
slow learning implies that p̂δω(z|ω′) is constant in ω′ at each δω. From this it is immediate
that every point-mass belief δω is a BeNE.
As a large literature highlights (for surveys, see Vives, 2010; Chamley, 2004), slow learning
is a central feature of many social learning models (e.g., Example 3): In these settings, new
action observations convey less and less information as the public belief grows confident,
because agents base their action choices increasingly on the public belief rather than their
private information.15 As illustrated in Example 2, slow learning also arises naturally in
single-agent settings if information acquisition is costly. By contrast, in environments such
as Example 1, where any price the monopolist sets generates non-vanishingly informative
14Esponda and Pouzo (2016) consider a setting where multiple agents learn jointly about a payoff-relevant
parameter and other agents’ behavior. They allow for mixed BeNE and show that if beliefs converge to µ∗
with positive probability, then µ∗ must be a BeNE belief (see their Lemma 2 and Theorem 2).
15Herding is an extreme manifestation of slow learning, where belief-updating ceases completely at some
mixed belief. But even absent herding (as in Example 3), sequential social learning is generally slow, as
quantified by Vives (1993); Hann-Caruthers, Martynov, and Tamuz (2018); Rosenberg and Vieille (2019).
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signals about demand, learning is not slow.
4 Stability analysis
4.1 Prediction accuracy orders and martingale approach
Before presenting our conditions for local stability, instability, and global stability of beliefs,
we introduce orders over states that compare how well they predict the true signal distribu-
tion at each belief µ. These prediction accuracy orders will play a central role in our stability
analysis and the martingale arguments on which it relies.
















dPµ(z) ≤ 0. (5)
That is, at belief µ, the perceived signal distribution in state ω achieves lower KL-divergence
relative to the true distribution than does the perceived signal distribution in state ω′. Write
ω KLµ ω′ if inequality (5) is strict. Note that δω is a BeNE if and only if ω %KLδω ω
′ for all ω′.
Our analysis relies on the following refinement of %KLµ . Given any q > 0, say that ω





dPµ(z) ≤ 1, (6)
and write ω qµ ω′ if inequality (6) is strict. To see the connection between q-dominance





, i.e., the perceived log-
likelihood ratio of states ω′ vs. ω, when signals z are drawn according to the true signal
distribution Pµ(·). Then the left-hand side of (5) is the expectation of X, while the left-hand
side of (6) is the moment-generating function MX(q) = E[eqX ] of X evaluated at q.
Whereas %KLµ is complete (by the representation on the LHS of (5)), %qµ is in general
incomplete.16 However, the q-dominance orders are nested and approximate KL-dominance
as q → 0:
Lemma 2. Fix any belief µ and states ω, ω′.
1. If ω qµ ω′ for some q > 0, then ω KLµ ω′ and ω q
′
µ ω
′ for all q′ ∈ (0, q).
16Note that q-dominance bears some formal resemblance to a generalization of KL-divergence known
as Rényi divergence. However, whereas KL-dominance amounts to comparing KL(Pµ(·), P̂µ(·|ω)) and
KL(Pµ(·), P̂µ(·|ω′)), q-dominance is not equivalent to comparing the corresponding Rényi divergences.
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2. If ω KLµ ω′, then there exists q > 0 such that ω qµ ω′.
To understand the role that q-dominance will play in our analysis, first consider the
correctly specified benchmark, where for some true state ω∗, Pµ(·) = P̂µ(·|ω∗) for all µ. In
this case, ω∗ %1µ ω for all µ and ω; indeed, (6) holds with equality when q = 1.17 This implies
a well-known property of correctly specified learning: The posterior ratio process µt(ω)
µt(ω∗)
is a


















The martingale property is central to analyzing long-run beliefs under correctly specified
learning. In particular, it implies that, by Doob’s convergence theorem, µt(ω)
µt(ω∗)
converges
almost surely (a.s.) to a nonnegative random limit.
Under misspecified learning, there is in general no state that globally 1-dominates all
other states. As a result, the martingale property is lost. However, the definition of %qµ
immediately implies a key observation: Throughout any region of beliefs where q-dominance
obtains, the qth power of the posterior ratio process becomes a nonnegative supermartingale.
Lemma 3. Suppose there exist q > 0 and B ⊆ ∆(Ω) such that ω %qµ ω′ for all µ ∈ B. Then,







with τ := inf{s : µs 6∈ B} (7)
is a nonnegative supermartingale with respect to Pµ0 and the filtration generated by µt.
Proof. Observe EPµ0 [`t+1|(µs)s≤t] =
`t
´ ( p̂µt (z|ω′)
p̂µt (z|ω)
)q
dPµt(z) ≤ `t if µs ∈ B ∀s ≤ t
`t otherwise.
Under the assumptions in Lemma 3, standard martingale methods from the correctly
specified setting, such as Doob’s convergence theorem and Markov’s inequality, can be ap-
plied locally, to the stopped process `t. Such arguments will play a key role throughout our
stability analysis, by providing useful information on the asymptotic behavior of the original
belief process µt. As we discuss in Remark 2, q-dominance is essential to this approach, as









pµ(z) dν(z) = 1.
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4.2 Local stability and instability
Based on the preceding observations, our first main result provides sufficient conditions for
belief δω to be locally stable or unstable:
Theorem 1. Consider any ω ∈ Ω. Belief δω is:
1. locally stable if there exists q > 0 and a neighborhood B 3 δω such that
ω qµ ω′ for all ω′ 6= ω and µ ∈ B \ {δω}. (8)
2. unstable if there exists q > 0 and a neighborhood B 3 δω such that
for some ω′ 6= ω, we have ω′ qµ ω for all µ ∈ B \ {δω}. (9)
By the first part, δω is locally stable if for some q, state ω strictly q-dominates all other
states at all beliefs in some neighborhood of δω, except possibly at the belief δω, where this
dominance need only be weak.18 Thus, condition (8) strengthens BeNE, which requires that
ω weakly KL-dominates all other states at the belief δω, in two ways: First, by comparing the
prediction accuracy of ω against other states at beliefs in a neighborhood B of δω; second,
by imposing strict q-dominance rather than weak KL-dominance throughout B \ {δω}. The
second part provides an analogous condition for instability; combined with Lemma 2, this
result also implies Lemma 1.
The proof of Theorem 1 is a simple application of the martingale construction in the
previous section. To see the idea, suppose that Ω = {ω, ω′} is binary. For the first part, con-






with τ := inf{s : µs 6∈ B}. By Lemma 3,
this is a nonnegative supermartingale. Thus, by Doob’s convergence theorem, `t converges
a.s. to a nonnegative random limit `∞. Based on this, we first show that if the belief pro-
cess µt remains in B forever with positive probability, then conditional on this event, µt
converges to δω a.s.: Otherwise, the random limit belief µ∞ ∈ B would be mixed with
positive probability, which we show is impossible by (8). Second, by applying Markov’s
inequality to `∞, we show that the probability that µt remains in B forever can be made
arbitrarily close to 1 by restricting to initial beliefs µ0 in a small enough subneighborhood
B′ ⊆ B around δω. Combining these observations implies that δω is locally stable. For the







with τ := inf{s : µs 6∈ B}, to show that µt a.s. leaves B.
18The weak dominance ω %qδω ω
′ follows from (8) and Assumption 1.
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The fact that conditions (8) and (9) do not impose strict dominance at the point-mass
belief δω is essential for applying Theorem 1 to environments with slow learning: Indeed,
under (4), the difference in prediction accuracy across states vanishes as µ approaches any
point-mass belief.19 To illustrate how conditions (8) and (9) can be verified straightforwardly
from the relationship between P and P̂ in this case, consider the following example:
Example 4. Consider Z = {0, 1} and any δω. Under slow learning, perceived signal prob-
abilities p̂µ(1|ω′) become independent of ω′ as µ approaches δω. Suppose these perceptions
understate the truth in any small enough neighborhood B of δω, i.e., p̂µ(1|ω′) ≤ pµ(1) for all
ω′ and µ ∈ B (the opposite case is analogous). Consider two possibilities near δω:
• Perceived signal probabilities in state ω are closest to the truth: That is, p̂µ(1|ω′) <
p̂µ(1|ω) for all ω′ 6= ω and µ ∈ B \ {δω}. Then, ω qµ ω′ for any q ∈ (0, 1).20 Thus, δω
is locally stable by (8).
• Perceived signal probabilities in some other state ω′ are closer to the truth: That is,
for some ω′ 6= ω, p̂µ(1|ω′) > p̂µ(1|ω) for all µ ∈ B \ {δω}. Then, analogously, ω′ qµ ω
for all q ∈ (0, 1). Thus, δω is unstable by (9).
In Section 5.2, we will apply similar observations to analyze Examples 2 and 3. N
At the same time, an immediate corollary of Theorem 1 is the following more demanding
sufficient condition for local stability, which is easy to verify in environments that do not
feature slow learning (or other ties in prediction accuracy). Call δω a strict BeNE if
ω KLδω ω
′ for all ω′ 6= ω. By Lemma 2 and Assumption 1, any strict BeNE satisfies (8).
Corollary 1. If δω is a strict BeNE, then δω is locally stable.
Bohren (2016) (extended by Bohren and Hauser (2021) to heterogeneous beliefs) derived
an analog of Corollary 1 under binary states |Ω| = 2 and finite Z. Their proofs use a “local
approximation” argument that is different from our martingale approach and does not extend
to settings that feature slow learning.21
While Corollary 1 is not applicable under slow learning, a convenient feature is that it
only involves considering KL-prediction accuracy differences at the single belief δω. Under
19That is, (5) and (6) hold with equality when µ = δω.














< 1 for any
q ∈ (0, 1), where the final inequality follows from Jensen’s inequality and the concavity of f(x) = xq.
21Specifically, they locally bound the log-likelihood ratio process under (P, P̂ ) by the corresponding process
under a different environment (Q, Q̂) with the property that Qµ, Q̂µ are independent of µ and that beliefs
converge to δω a.s. (by the law of large numbers). The construction of (Q, Q̂) requires the log-likelihood
ratio process under (P, P̂ ) to have non-vanishing drift near δω, which implies that ω KLδω ω
′ for ω′ 6= ω.
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slow learning, Theorem 1 can be used to derive a condition for local stability with a similar
feature: This condition only involves computing the derivative of the KL-prediction accuracy
differences at the belief δω; see Online Appendix D.1.
Remark 2. To understand the importance of refining KL-dominance to q-dominance, sup-
pose (8) is weakened to the assumption that in some neighborhood B 3 δω,
ω KLµ ω′ for all ω′ 6= ω and µ ∈ B \ {δω}. (10)






with τ := inf{s : µs 6∈ B} are supermartingales.
However, since these supermartingales are unbounded below as µt approaches δω, the above
arguments based on Doob’s convergence theorem and Markov’s inequality no longer apply.
Indeed, Online Appendix D.2 shows that (10) does not imply that δω is locally stable. N
4.3 Global stability
Global stability is significantly more demanding than local stability. For instance, even if δω
is the unique locally stable belief, it need not be globally stable. In this section, we use our
martingale approach to obtain two sufficient conditions for global stability that strengthen
the local stability criterion in Theorem 1 in complementary ways. Both conditions place
some additional restrictions on the environment, but we illustrate their usefulness with the
applications in Section 5.
4.3.1 Iterated elimination of dominated states
Our first approach extends the previous local stability arguments by constructing super-
martingales that apply not only near δω but more globally.
We employ a generalization of global stability to sets of beliefs: Call M ⊆ ∆(Ω) a
globally stable set if Pµ[infν∈M ‖µt−ν‖ → 0] = 1 for every initial belief µ. Note that ∆(Ω)
is trivially globally stable. We show that global stability is preserved under the following
process of iterated elimination of dominated states , defined similarly to the iterated
elimination of dominated strategies in games: For each subset Ω′ ⊆ Ω, let
S(Ω′) := {ω ∈ Ω′ : 6 ∃ω′ ∈ Ω′ s.t. ω′ KLµ ω for all µ ∈ ∆(Ω′)}.
Then recursively define S0(Ω) := Ω, Sk+1(Ω) := S(Sk(Ω)) for all k = 0, 1, . . ., and S∞(Ω) :=⋂
k∈N S
k(Ω). We say belief continuity holds if for each ω ∈ Ω, µ ∈ ∆(Ω) and z ∈ Z with
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pµ(z) > 0, we have that pµ(z) and p̂µ(z|ω) are continuous in µ.22
Theorem 2. Assume belief continuity holds. Then ∆ (S∞(Ω)) is globally stable. In partic-
ular, if S∞(Ω) = {ω} for some ω ∈ Ω, then belief δω is globally stable.




is globally stable for all k. Since
∆(Ω) is globally stable, it suffices to show that whenever ∆(Ω′) is globally stable for some
Ω′ ⊆ Ω, then so is ∆ (S(Ω′)). This can be established using simple martingale arguments.
To see the idea, suppose that S(Ω′) = Ω′ \ {ω′}. Then by Lemma 2 and belief continuity,
there exist q > 0 and ω′′ ∈ Ω′ such that ω′′ qµ ω′ for all µ ∈ ∆(Ω′), and hence also ω′′ qµ ω′





with τ = inf{s : µs 6∈ B} (11)
is a nonnegative supermartingale. Similar to Theorem 1, this implies that (i) from any initial
µ ∈ B, µt remains forever in B with positive probability; and (ii) µt(ω′) converges to 0 a.s.
conditional on remaining in B. We show that combined with the assumption that ∆(Ω′)
(and hence B ⊇ ∆(Ω′)) is globally stable, this yields that ∆(Ω′ \ {ω′}) is globally stable.
Note that although the definition of iterated elimination is based on strict KL-dominance,
q-dominance again plays an essential role in the proof of Theorem 2, by allowing us to
construct the nonnegative supermartingale (11).
Under infinite states, Appendix B.1 shows that Theorem 2 remains true unchanged, by
extending the above martingale arguments. As we illustrate in Section 5.1, an important
application of this result is to environments with rich one-dimensional state spaces.
4.3.2 Global stability via uniform local dominance
Theorem 2 requires that eliminated states are dominated at all beliefs in a subsimplex
∆(Sk(Ω)), which is restrictive in some applications. In such settings, an alternative approach
to obtain global stability is to restrict the prediction accuracy order only locally, near point-
mass beliefs, but to impose more structure on how states are ranked. The following result
provides one formalization of this approach that is useful for our applications in Section 5.2:
Proposition 1. Suppose that belief continuity holds and states Ω = {ω1, . . . , ωN} can be
enumerated in such a way that
22Belief continuity can be dropped in Theorem 2 and Proposition 1, up to slightly strengthening the
corresponding dominance requirements; see also footnote 29.
23Call B a neighborhood of a set M ⊆ ∆(Ω) if there exists ε > 0 such that Bε(µ) ⊆ B for all µ ∈M .
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(i) for each ω, there exists q > 0 and a neighborhood B 3 δω such that for all m and n
with m > n, we have ωn qµ ωm for all µ ∈ B \ {δω};
(ii) for all n 6= N and mixed µ, there is z ∈ suppPµ(·) with p̂µ(z|ωn) > p̂µ(z|ωm) for all
m > n.
Then δω1 is globally stable.
Condition (i) requires that, near all point-mass beliefs δω, the prediction accuracy ranking
is the same: states with a lower index dominate higher states.24 For binary Ω, (i) amounts to
imposing the local stability condition (8) from Theorem 1 on δω1 and the instability condition
(9) on δω2 . However, when |Ω| > 2, (i) is more demanding than imposing local stability on δω1
and instability on all other δωn ; we explain the role of this added strength below. Condition
(ii) is relatively weak, in that it does not restrict the prediction accuracy ranking. One
natural condition that implies (ii) is if perceived signal distributions satisfy the monotone
likelihood ratio property, as is the case in many applications, including Examples 1–3.
When Ω is binary, the logic behind Proposition 1 is analogous to Bohren (2016), who
derived a similar result (under a strengthening of condition (i) that requires strict KL-
dominance at point-mass beliefs, ruling out slow learning). By condition (i), there are
neighborhoods B1 3 δω1 and B2 3 δω2 such that from any initial belief in B1, µt converges
to δω1 with positive probability, while from any initial belief in B2, µt a.s. leaves B2. By
condition (ii), one can find some T such that with positive probability, µt reaches B1 within
T periods from any initial belief µ 6∈ B1 ∪ B2. Combining these observations, a simple
recursive argument shows that µt converges to δω1 a.s. from any initial belief.
Beyond binary states, say if Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3}, a complication with the above argument
is the following:25 Even if δω1 is locally stable and δω2 and δω3 are unstable, condition (ii) is
consistent with beliefs getting stuck in a neighborhood of the subsimplex ∆({ω2, ω3}) and
cycling forever between δω2 and δω3 . However, this is ruled out by the uniform ranking over
states that condition (i) imposes near point-mass beliefs. Indeed, as we show using similar
martingale arguments as before, the latter ensures that whenever beliefs approach δω2 or δω3 ,
they must escape in the direction of δω1 with positive probability.
Finally, one might also be interested in a weak form of global stability, which only requires
that from all initial beliefs, process µt converges to δω1 with positive probability (rather than
with probability one, as ensured by our results). Using similar arguments as above, it can be
shown that δω1 is globally stable in this weak sense if it satisfies the local stability condition
24For example, if Z = {0, 1}, then by the same logic as in Example 4, this is the case if near all δω, we
have pµ(1) ≤ p̂µ(1|ω1) < . . . < p̂µ(1|ωN ); as we will see, this arises naturally in Examples 2–3.
25Bohren and Hauser (2021) address related challenges under binary states but heterogeneous models.
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(8) and if condition (ii) in Proposition 1 is only imposed for n = 1. Note that under this
weak notion, multiple beliefs δω can be globally stable.
5 Applications
We now apply the preceding stability results to two classes of economic applications.
5.1 Active learning under one-dimensional states
First, we consider single-agent active learning under rich one-dimensional states, Ω ⊆ R,
as in many important applications in the literature. We show how the iterated elimination
criterion in Theorem 2 is straightforward to verify in this setting, providing a simple and
unified method to establish global stability.
For ease of exposition, we assume that Ω = [ω, ω] is a compact interval; as noted, Ap-
pendix B.1 shows that Theorem 2 remains valid under infinite states.26 Consider an active
learning environment as in Remark 1. Assume that the agent’s action set A ⊆ R is an
interval, that her action choices a : ∆(Ω) → A are FOSD-increasing and continuous, and
that KL(Ga(·), Ĝa(·|ω)) is strictly quasi-convex in ω and continuous in (a, ω).
These assumptions ensure that for each ω, there is a unique state m(ω) that is KL-
dominant at δω, i.e., m(ω) KLδω ω
′ for all ω′ 6= m(ω). Observe that ω is a fixed point of the
one-dimensional map m : Ω→ Ω if and only if δω is a strict BeNE.
The following result shows that iterated elimination of dominated states corresponds to
iterated application of the map m. Moreover, simple conditions that only involve considering
the fixed points of the maps m or m2 yield that S∞(Ω) = {ω̂} is a singleton, in which case
Theorem 2 implies that δω̂ is globally stable:27
Proposition 2. For all k = 1, 2, . . . ,∞, we have Sk(Ω) = mk(Ω). Moreover:
1. Suppose m is weakly increasing. Then S∞(Ω) = {ω̂} if and only if ω̂ is the unique
fixed point of m.
2. Suppose m is weakly decreasing. Then S∞(Ω) = {ω̂} if and only if ω̂ is the unique
fixed point of m2.
26Similar analysis goes through whenever Ω is a finite but sufficiently dense subset of [ω, ω], as in this case
S∞(Ω) approximates S∞([ω, ω]) (see Appendix F in the previous version, Frick, Iijima, and Ishii, 2020b).
27Parts 1 and 2 of Proposition 2 parallel conditions for dominance solvability in games with strategic
complements (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990) and substitutes (Zimper, 2007), respectively.
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Deriving m is straightforward in many applications in the literature, and many natural
forms of misspecification that are considered induce an increasing or decreasing m. To nest
these applications, assume further that Z = R and that action a induces the true signal
distribution according to z = g(a) + ε, but the agent perceives signals in state ω to follow
z = ĝ(a, ω) + ε, where g : A → R and ĝ : A × Ω → R are continuously differentiable with
∂ĝ
∂ω
> 0, and the noise term ε is distributed according to a log-concave and strictly positive
density on R. Then, letting a(ω) := a(δω), any interior m(ω) ∈ (ω, ω) solves
ĝ(a(ω),m(ω)) = g(a(ω)). (12)




(a(ω),m(ω)), and decreasing if




(a(ω),m(ω)) for all ω, capturing that the agent either under- or
overstates the marginal effect of her actions on signals.
For example, based on this, it is straightforward to establish global stability in the fol-
lowing applications:
• Monopoly pricing: In Example 1, g(a) = ω∗− βa, ĝ(a, ω) = ω− β̂a, and a(ω) = ω
2β̂
.
By the above, m is increasing/decreasing if the monopolist over-/underestimates the
slope of demand β, and m(ω) = ω∗+ ω
2β̂
(β̂−β) when this is interior. If | β̂−β
2β̂
| < 1, then
m and m2 are contractions, and thus admit a unique fixed point ω̂, where ω̂ = 2β̂ω
∗
β̂+β
when this is interior. Hence, δω̂ is globally stable by Proposition 2 and Theorem 2.
• Effort choice under overconfidence: In Heidhues, Kőszegi, and Strack (2018)
(HKS), g and ĝ take the form g(a) = Q(a, β, ω∗) and ĝ(a, ω) = Q(a, β̂, ω) for some
function Q. Here, signals z can be interpreted as output, actions a as effort choice,
states ω as project quality (with true quality ω∗), and β and β̂ as the agent’s true
and perceived ability. The agent chooses a(µ) to maximize expected output. When
the agent is overconfident (β̂ > β), the natural assumptions that HKS impose on the
output function Q ensure that m is increasing with a unique fixed point ω̂, where
ω̂ < ω∗ (see Online Appendix C.2.1). Thus, Proposition 2 and Theorem 2 immediately
imply HKS’s result that the pessimistic belief δω̂ is globally stable.
• Optimal stopping under the gambler’s fallacy: Similar reasoning yields the global
stability result in He (2018), where m can again be seen to be increasing and admit a
unique fixed point (see Online Appendix C.2.2).
Esponda, Pouzo, and Yamamoto (2021) (Section 7) consider a similar one-dimensional
state setting and provide conditions for local/global stability and instability. Different from
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our iterated elimination approach, their approach is based on characterizing limiting action
frequencies by means of a differential inclusion. While we consider continuous actions in this
section, their approach relies on a finite action space. Our iterated elimination approach can
also be extended to study local stability in the current setting; see Appendix B.2.
5.2 Slow learning and fragility of long-run beliefs
Next, we illustrate how to apply our results to environments with slow learning, by analyzing
Examples 2 and 3. Our analysis highlights how slow learning can render long-run beliefs
fragile against misspecification. Section 5.2.3 contrasts these findings with other recent work
that has examined the robustness of learning outcomes to misspecification.
Throughout, we consider finite state spaces Ω = {ω1, . . . , ωN} ⊆ R+, with ω1 < . . . < ωN .
5.2.1 Costly information acquisition
First, we analyze Example 2. For any cost function C, we index the agent’s precision choice
γβ̂(µ) given by (2) by the perceived base rate β̂. While (2) assumes for simplicity that γ is
chosen myopically, our results generalize to forward-looking agents who maximize expected
discounted payoffs.28 Assume γ ∈ (0, 1) and β, β̂ ∈ (0, 1−γ) are such that true and perceived
signal probabilities β + γβ̂(µ)ω
∗ and β̂ + γβ̂(µ)ω are always well-defined and nondegenerate.
We also assume that γβ̂(µ) is continuous in µ.
29
Suppose first that the agent incurs the same constant cost C(γ) = c for any precision
choice γ, so information is effectively costless. Then learning is successful when the agent is
correctly specified (β̂ = β) and successful learning is robust to small amounts of misspecifi-
cation. Formally, say that learning is successful at ω∗ if, when the true state is ω∗, we
have Pµ[µt → δω∗ ] = 1 for all beliefs µ ∈ ∆(Ω) with µ(ω∗) > 0.
Lemma 4. Suppose C is constant. For any β, there exists ε > 0 such that for any β̂ with
|β̂ − β| ≤ ε, learning is successful in all true states ω∗.
When information is costless, then for all β̂, the agent always chooses the maximal
precision γ. This implies that when β̂ = β, the true state ω∗ strictly dominates all other states








28Note the proof of slow learning (Lemma 5) remains valid, as the continuation value is continuous in µ.
29Without continuity, the main result (Proposition 3) remains valid under the following assumption: for
any compact set K of mixed beliefs, infµ∈K γβ̂(µ) > 0. This is slightly stronger than the current assumption
(“successful learning at all states when β̂ = β”), which is equivalent to the requirement that γβ̂(µ) > 0 for
all mixed µ (Lemma 6). The robustness of costless learning (Lemma 4) does not rely on continuity.
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Figure 1: Prediction accuracy ranking of ω1 vs. ω2 as a function of µ when ω∗ = ω1. Left: β̂ = β.
Right: β > β̂. Here DKLµ (ω2, ω1) := KL(Pµ(·|ω∗), P̂µ(·|ω2))−KL(Pµ(·|ω∗), P̂µ(·|ω1)).
1 is independent of µ. Given this, the same is true whenever β̂ is sufficiently close to β, based
on which we conclude that learning is successful.
Next, suppose information is costly, in the sense that C is strictly increasing in γ. The
key departure this introduces is the following:
Lemma 5. Suppose C is strictly increasing. For any β̂, limµ→δω γβ̂(µ) = 0 for every ω.
That is, if information is (even slightly) costly, then the agent stops acquiring informa-
tion in the limit as she becomes confident in any particular state ω, because her value to
information vanishes as she becomes confident. Lemma 5 implies that costly information






′ + β̂ = β̂, ∀ω, ω′.
Based on this, we show that learning under costly information is fragile against misspec-
ification: Suppose learning is successful whenever the agent is correctly specified. Then, in
sharp contrast with Lemma 4, arbitrarily small amounts of misspecification not only break
successful learning, but indeed render the agent’s long-run belief independent of the true
state ω∗: If β̂ < β (resp. β̂ > β), then regardless of ω∗, she becomes confident in the highest
(resp. lowest) possible state.
Proposition 3. Suppose C is strictly increasing and for any β, β̂ with β = β̂, learning is
successful at all states ω∗. Then:
1. For any β, β̂ with β > β̂, δωN is globally stable in all true states ω∗.
2. For any β, β̂ with β < β̂, δω1 is globally stable in all true states ω∗.
To see the idea, suppose that Ω = {ω1, ω2} and the true state is ω1. For any β̂, the
fact that learning is successful at all states when β = β̂ means that γβ̂(µ) > 0 for all mixed
µ; otherwise the agent’s belief would get stuck at some initial mixed beliefs. At the same
time, by Lemma 5, limµ→δω γβ̂(µ) = 0. As a result, when β = β̂, the true state ω1 strictly
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dominates ω2 at all mixed beliefs, but in contrast with costless learning, the gap in prediction
accuracy now vanishes as beliefs approach δω1 or δω2 . As shown in Figure 1, this makes the
prediction accuracy ranking near point-mass beliefs highly sensitive to misspecification.30
Indeed, if β > β̂, the ranking between ω1 and ω2 is reversed: Since γ is very small near
point-mass beliefs, the true probability γω1 + β of the high signal exceeds the perceived
probabilities γω2 + β̂, γω1 + β̂ in both states, but because ω2 > ω1, the perceived probability
in state ω2 comes closer to the truth. By the logic in Example 4, this implies ω2 qµ ω1 for
all q ∈ (0, 1) and µ near δω1 and δω2 . Intuitively, if signals are precise (γ is high), the true
state always explains the agent’s observations best, but if signals are sufficiently imprecise
(γ is low), then overestimating the state can partly compensate for underestimating the base
rate of the high signal. Finally, since ω2 strictly dominates ω1 near both point-mass beliefs
and the probabilities of the high signal are increasing in states, Proposition 1 applies up to
relabeling states in decreasing order. Thus, when β > β̂, δω2 is globally stable.31
Finally, to understand when Proposition 3 applies, we clarify which cost functions lead to
successful learning when the agent is correctly specified. To state this, we slightly strengthen
the requirement that the utility v : ∆(Ω)→ R is strictly convex, as follows:
Lemma 6. Suppose v is twice continuously differentiable with a positive-definite Hessian.
Fix any β̂. For any twice continuously differentiable cost function C with C ′(0) = C ′′(0) = 0,
γβ̂(µ) > 0 for all mixed µ. (13)
Moreover, (13) is necessary and sufficient for learning to be successful at all ω∗ when β = β̂.
Lemma 6 provides “Inada conditions” on C which ensure that small amounts of infor-
mation are very cheap. Thus, the agent remains willing to acquire a positive amount of
information whenever she is not completely certain about the state. These conditions are
satisfied, for example, by any power function C(γ) = γd with d > 2.32
5.2.2 Sequential social learning
Next, consider Example 3. We impose the following additional assumptions: Private signals
st are drawn i.i.d. across agents conditional on each state ω, according to a positive and
30The figure uses KL-dominance for the sake of graphical illustration, but the proof relies on q-dominance.
31Here, the true long-run signal distribution disagrees with the agent’s perceived long-run distribution
whenever β̂ 6= β. However, this is not essential for the fragility result: For example, an analog of Proposition 3
obtains if the agent is correct about β but (even slightly) misperceives the sensitivity of the signal distribution
to her choice of γ; in this case the true and perceived long-run signal distributions exactly coincide.
32The restriction C ′′(0) = 0 on the second derivative is related to the Radner-Stiglitz non-concavity in the
value of information (Chade and Schlee, 2002). Since the agent’s marginal value of information is zero at
γ = 0, the restriction C ′(0) = 0 on the first derivative is not enough to ensure a positive choice of γ.
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continuous density φ(·|ω) that satisfies the monotone likelihood ratio property. True and
perceived type distributions F and F̂ admit positive densities, and the utility difference
v(θ, ω) := u(1, θ, ω)−u(0, θ, ω) between actions is strictly increasing and continuous in types
and states (θ, ω), with limθ→−∞ v(θ, ω) < 0 and limθ→+∞ v(θ, ω) > 0; thus, sufficiently low
(risk-averse) types always prefer action 0 (not adopt) and sufficiently high (risk-tolerant)
types always prefer action 1 (adopt).




F (θ∗(µs))φ(s|ω∗) ds, p̂µ(0|ω) =
ˆ
F̂ (θ∗(µs))φ(s|ω) ds,
where µs ∈ ∆(Ω) denotes the Bayesian update of µ following private signal realization s,
and θ∗(ν) denotes the type who is indifferent between action 0 and 1 at belief ν. Note that




. Observe that θ∗i is strictly decreasing in i.
We first note that when agents are correctly specified, learning is successful:
Lemma 7. Suppose that F̂ = F . Then learning is successful in all true states ω∗.
An analogous result is established by Goeree, Palfrey, and Rogers (2006). Observe that
herding is ruled out here due to rich preference heterogeneity (in particular, the existence of
dominant types), despite the fact that private signals need not have unbounded precision.
However, we observe next that sequential social learning leads to slow learning:
Lemma 8. For all F̂ , ω, and ω′, we have limµ→δω
´
F̂ (θ∗(µs))φ(s|ω′) ds = F̂ (θ∗ω).
Lemma 8 shows that as the public belief becomes confident in any given state ω, the
perceived probability of observing action 0, limµ→δω p̂µ(0|ω′) = F̂ (θ∗ω), is the same in all
states ω′; that is, (4) holds. This reflects the familiar slow-learning logic under sequential
social learning that we discussed in Section 3.3.
Similar to costly information acquisition, this again leads successful learning to be highly
fragile against misspecification. The following result classifies possible learning outcomes:
Proposition 4. Fix any F and F̂ . In each true state ω∗:
1. δωN is globally stable if F (θ∗i ) < F̂ (θ∗i ) for all i, locally stable if F (θ∗N) < F̂ (θ∗N), and
unstable if F (θ∗N) > F̂ (θ∗N).
2. δω1 is globally stable if F (θ∗i ) > F̂ (θ∗i ) for all i, locally stable if F (θ∗1) > F̂ (θ∗1), and
unstable if F (θ∗1) < F̂ (θ∗1).
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3. For each n ∈ {2, . . . , N − 1}, δωn is unstable if F (θ∗n) 6= F̂ (θ∗n).
Depending on the nature of misspecification, Proposition 4 highlights three general pos-
sibilities. First, beliefs might converge globally to a point-mass on the highest (resp. lowest)
state. Similar to Proposition 3, this occurs if agents systematically underestimate (resp.
overestimate) the type distribution (e.g., extent of risk tolerance in the population), no mat-
ter how close F̂ is to F and regardless of the true state ω∗. Second, the extreme beliefs
δω1 and/or δωN might be locally stable, if agents overestimate the share of very high types
(above θ∗1) and/or of very low types (below θ∗N). Finally, if agents underestimate both the
shares of very high types and of very low types (i.e., underestimate type heterogeneity), then
generically all point-mass beliefs are unstable, so beliefs cycle.33
To see the idea, consider any ωi. If F (θ∗i ) < F̂ (θ∗i ), then Lemma 8 implies that at all public
beliefs µ close to the point-mass belief δωi , the perceived probability of action 0, p̂µ(0|ω) ≈
F̂ (θ∗i ), is strictly higher in all states ω than the actual probability pµ(0|ω∗) ≈ F (θ∗i ). At the
same time, by the assumptions on signals and utilities, p̂µ(0|ω) is strictly decreasing in ω at
all mixed µ. Thus, at all mixed µ close to δωi , the perceived action distribution comes closest
to the actual one at the highest state ωN . Analogously, if F (θ∗i ) > F̂ (θ∗i ), then the lowest
state ω1 dominates all other states near δωi . Based on this, the local stability and instability
results follow from Theorem 1, while Proposition 1 implies the global stability results.
5.2.3 Discussion
Our finding that slow learning can lead to fragility against misspecification complements
other recent work. Bohren and Hauser (2021) (BH) establish a general robustness result for
misspecified learning: If learning is successful under correct specification, then learning is
also successful whenever agents’ perceptions are close enough to the true model. The key
difference is that they consider environments that do not feature slow learning, because,
even near point-mass beliefs, agents take actions that generate non-vanishingly informative
signals. For instance, this is naturally the case in Example 1 or under costless learning.
Intuitively, robustness in these settings results from the fact that, under correct specifica-
tion, the difference in prediction accuracy between the true state ω∗ and all other states is
bounded away from zero; given this, the same remains true under small enough amounts
of misspecification, similar to the logic in Lemma 4. By contrast, when learning is slow,
as in Examples 2–3, then differences in prediction accuracy vanish near point-mass beliefs.
33Relatedly, Gagnon-Bartsch (2017) considers sequential social learning with “taste projection” and shows
that a point-mass on the true state can be unstable under arbitrarily small misspecification. His environment
can be seen to also feature slow learning, but due to the difference in the nature of misspecification, his setting
requires large misspecification in order for a point-mass on an incorrect state to be locally/globally stable.
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As illustrated above, this renders the prediction accuracy ranking, and hence stable beliefs,
highly sensitive to small amounts of misspecification.
Even under costly information acquisition or social learning, the usual slow-learning
logic might hold only approximately if other offsetting forces are introduced: For example,
agents might have access to small amounts of exogenous costless information each period
(similarly, under social learning, BH introduce a small fraction of “autarkic” agents, who
act solely based on their private information, ignoring others’ actions). For a fixed positive
amount of such exogenous information, the results in BH imply that learning is successful
whenever agents’ perceptions are within some small enough threshold ε > 0 of the true
model. Complementary to this, our analysis implies that the smaller the amount of exogenous
information, the smaller is ε (i.e., the more sensitive is learning to misspecification), and in
the limit as there is no exogenous information, vanishingly small amounts of misspecification
can generate extreme failures of learning.34 Taken together, these results suggest that some
policy interventions, such as releasing additional public signals or shutting down some agents’
observations of others’ actions, might be used to “robustify” learning against misspecification,
but that the effectiveness of such interventions would depend on the relative strength of
additional information and agents’ amount of misspecification.
The slow learning channel we highlight also complements other fragility results in the lit-
erature. Frick, Iijima, and Ishii (2020a) (FII20) study a different social learning model, with
a continuum of states and continuum of agents, who each privately observe the action of a
random other agent each period. This setting is not nested by the current paper (nor by BH),
as there is no public belief. Importantly, due to action observations being private, this set-
ting also does not feature slow learning: As FII20 show, agents view new action observations
as non-vanishingly informative, no matter how confident they themselves have become in a
particular state. Nevertheless, FII20 establish that arbitrarily small misspecification about
the type distribution F can lead beliefs to converge to a state-independent point-mass, sim-
ilar to the fragility result in Section 5.2.2. The mechanism behind the two results is quite
different. Specifically, in Section 5.2.2, slow learning implies that all point-mass beliefs are
BeNE, and the logic behind Proposition 4 is that misspecification can discontinuously change
which of these beliefs are stable. By contrast, FII20 highlight a discontinuity at the level of
the equilibrium correspondence: all point-mass beliefs are BeNE under correct specification,
but misspecification can discontinuously shrink the BeNE set to a single state-independent
point-mass. In contrast with Proposition 4, the discontinuity in FII20 relies on a continuous
34To make this more concrete, consider Example 2. Suppose that true and perceived probabilities are
β + (γ(µ) + α)ω∗ and β̂ + (γ(µ) + α)ω, where α > 0 captures exogenous information. Then for any β̂ > β
(resp. β̂ < β), there exists α > 0 such that whenever α < α, then δωN (resp. δω1) is globally stable at all ω∗.
Here, α can be chosen to be decreasing in ε = |β̂ − β|, with α(ε)→ 0 as ε→ 0.
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state space, and they show that in finite state spaces, successful learning is robust.
Cho and Kasa (2017) consider single-agent learning under a Markovian fundamental.
Their setting is also not nested by ours and does not feature slow learning, but they show
that long-run beliefs can be discontinuous against the details of the agent’s misspecification.
Their discontinuity result holds away from the correctly specified benchmark and relies on
intertemporal correlation in the signal process.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper presents an approach to analyze belief convergence in a broad class of misspec-
ified learning environments, including single-agent and social learning. The key ingredients
underlying our approach are (i) a novel prediction accuracy order over subjective models, q-
dominance, and (ii) the observation that throughout any region of beliefs where q-dominance
obtains, standard martingale arguments from the correctly specified setting can be applied
locally. Based on this, we obtain conditions for local/global stability or instability of long-
run beliefs. One difference with existing approaches is that our results can be applied to
study the impact of misspecification when learning is slow. When this is the case, as is
natural under costly information acquisition or social learning, we illustrate that successful
learning can be highly fragile against misspecification. We also apply our results to unify
and generalize various convergence results in previously studied settings.
Fruitful directions in which to extend our results include multi-agent settings with het-
erogeneous beliefs (partially addressed in Appendix G of the previous version, Frick, Iijima,
and Ishii, 2020b) and Markov decision problems (which we explore in ongoing work). An-
other interesting direction is to analyze when a mixed belief µ is stable: This can be seen
as an extreme form of slow learning, where belief-updating ceases completely before agents
have become confident in any given state. We expect that stability conditions for this case
might be obtained by again requiring a suitable transformation of the posterior ratio process
to be a nonnegative supermartingale near µ.
Appendix
Appendix A contains all proofs for Section 4 (Lemma 1 is immediate from Theorem 1). Appendix B
extends the stability analysis to infinite state spaces. The proofs for the applications in Section 5,
as well as all supplemental material referenced in the text, appear in Online Appendices C–D.
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A Proofs for Section 4
A.1 Preliminary results
Say belief continuity holds at M ⊆ ∆(Ω) if for each ω ∈ Ω, µ ∈ M and z ∈ Z with pµ(z) > 0,
we have that pµ(z) and p̂µ(z|ω) are continuous in µ.
Lemma 9. Assume belief continuity holds at M ⊆ ∆(Ω). Pick q∗ as in Assumption 1.2. For all ω,




pµ(z) dν(z) is continuous in µ on M .




























∣∣∣∣ dν(z) ≤ 0,
where the second inequality holds by belief continuity and the reverse Fatou lemma, as the functions
integrated by ν are dominated by `(·)q supµ pµ(·), which is ν-integrable by Assumption 1.2.
The following result shows that mixed beliefs are unstable under an identification condition.
The argument is similar to Theorem B.1 in Smith and Sørensen (2000):
Lemma 10. Take any compact set K ⊆ ∆(Ω) at which belief continuity holds. Suppose there exist
ω, ω′ such that for each µ ∈ K, we have (i) µ(ω), µ(ω′) > 0 and (ii) p̂µ(z|ω) 6= p̂µ(z|ω′) for some




Proof. For each µ ∈ K, (ii) yields some zµ ∈ supp(Pµ) such that
∣∣∣log p̂µ(zµ|ω)p̂µ(zµ|ω′) ∣∣∣ > 0. Since perceived




∣∣∣∣ > 0, Pµ(Zµ) > 0.




∣∣∣∣ > 0, infµ′∈Bµ Pµ′(Zµ) > 0.




∣∣∣∣ > γ, infµ′∈Bµi Pµ′(Zµi) > γ, for all i = 1, . . . , n.
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Suppose for a contradiction that Pµ0 [∃τ <∞ s.t. µt ∈ K ∀t ≥ τ, and ∃ limt
µt(ω)
µt(ω′)
] > 0 for some
initial belief µ0. Since the belief process is Markov, there exists an initial belief µ′0 ∈ K such that
Pµ′0 [µt ∈ K ∀t, and ∃ limt
µt(ω)
µt(ω′)




conditional on the event {µt ∈ K ∀t, and ∃ limt µt(ω)µt(ω′)}. Then
Pµ′0
[
µt ∈ K ∀t and ∃T <∞ s.t.
∣∣∣∣log µt(ω)µt(ω′) − `
∣∣∣∣ ≤ γ/2 ∀t ≥ T] > 0. (14)
But for any t, if µt ∈ K and
∣∣∣log µt(ω)µt(ω′) − `∣∣∣ ≤ γ/2, then there exists i such that µt ∈ Bµi . Hence,
by construction, there is probability at least γ > 0 that
∣∣∣log µt+1(ω)µt+1(ω′) − `∣∣∣ > γ/2. Since the process
is Markov, this implies that the event in (14) occurs with zero probability, a contradiction.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Consider the random variable log p̂µ(z|ω
′)
p̂µ(z|ω) , where z is distributed according to Pµ. The correspond-




dPµ(z) is well-defined for q ∈ [−q∗, q∗] by




p̂µ(z|ω) dPµ(z) and that M is convex with M(0) = 1.
Part 1. If ω qµ ω′ for some q > 0, then M(q) < 1 = M(0). Thus, convexity of M implies for




q )M(0) < 1, i.e., ω 
q′
µ ω′. By convexity of M , we also




Part 2. If ω KLµ ω′, then M ′(0) < 0. Thus, for all small enough q > 0, M(q) < M(0) = 1,
i.e., ω qµ ω′.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 1
First part: Suppose there exist q > 0 and B 3 δω such that (8) holds. For any initial belief µ0 with






, where τ := inf{s : µs 6∈ B}. By (8) and Lemma 3, each `t(ω′) is
a nonnegative supermartingale. Thus, by Doob’s convergence theorem, there exists an L∞-random
variable `∞(ω′) such that `t(ω′)→ `∞(ω′) occurs a.s.
To prove that δω is locally stable, it suffices to show the following two claims:
Claim 1: For any initial belief µ0, Pµ0 [µt ∈ B ∀t and µt → δω] = Pµ0 [µt ∈ B ∀t].
Proof of Claim 1. Consider any initial belief µ0 such that Pµ0 [µt ∈ B, ∀t] > 0. We show that
Pµ0 [µt → δω|µt ∈ B ∀t] = 1. Conditional on the event {µt ∈ B, ∀t}, we have τ = ∞, so the fact
that `t(ω′) → `∞(ω′) a.s. implies that each µt(ω
′)
µt(ω)
converges a.s. to a finite value. Suppose for a
contradiction that for some ω′ 6= ω, Pµ0 [limt
µt(ω′)
µt(ω)
> 0 | τ = ∞] > 0. Then there exists a compact




∞] > 0. But this contradicts Lemma 10, because for any µ ∈ B \ {δω}, (8) yields some z ∈ suppPµ
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with p̂µ(z|ω) 6= p̂µ(z|ω′). Hence, we have Pµ0 [limt
µt(ω′)
µt(ω)
= 0 | τ = ∞] = 1 for all ω′ 6= ω. Thus,
Pµ0 [µt → δω | τ =∞] = 1, as claimed.
Claim 2: For any γ > 0, there exists a neighborhood B′ ⊆ B of δω such that Pµ0 [µt ∈ B ,∀t] ≥ γ
for any initial belief µ0 ∈ B′.







< ε+} ⊆ B.
Pick ε− > 0 such that ε−ε+ ≤ 1− γ. For any µ0 ∈ B







< ε−}, we have












where the second inequality uses Markov’s inequality and the third follows from Fatou’s lemma and
the fact that each `t(ω′) is a nonnegative supermartingale. Thus, Pµ0 [µt ∈ B, ∀t] ≥ γ.
Second part: Suppose there exists a neighborhood B 3 δω such that (9) holds for some
ω′ 6= ω. Up to restricting to a subneighborhood of B, we can assume that there exists ε > 0 such
that µ(ω) > ε for all µ ∈ B. Fix any initial belief µ0 ∈ B \{δω}. Let τ := inf{s : µs 6∈ B}. To prove






which is a non-negative supermartingale by (9) and Lemma 3. Hence, Doob’s convergence theorem
yields an L∞-random variable `∞ such that `t → `∞ a.s.
Suppose for a contradiction that with positive probability, we have τ = ∞. Conditional on





= `t for all t. Thus, conditional on τ = ∞, µt(ω)µt(ω′) converges a.s. to
an L∞ random limit limt
µt(ω)
µt(ω′)
, which must be strictly positive since µ(ω) > ε for all µ ∈ B.
Hence, there exists some compact set K ⊆ B \ {δω} such that µ(ω), µ(ω′) > 0 for all µ ∈ K and
Pµ0 [∃T s.t. µt ∈ K∀t ≥ T and ∃ limt
µt(ω)
µt(ω′)
| τ = ∞] > 0. But this contradicts Lemma 10, because
(9) implies that for each µ ∈ K, there exists z ∈ suppPµ with p̂µ(zµ|ω) 6= p̂µ(zµ|ω′).
A.4 Proof of Theorem 2
This result is a special case of Theorem 3 in Appendix B.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 1
We call K ⊆ ∆(Ω) an unstable set if there exists a neighborhood B of K such that Pµ0 [∃t, µt 6∈
B] = 1 for every initial belief µ0 ∈ B \K. We call K ⊆ ∆(Ω) transient if Pµ0 [∃t s.t. µt 6∈ K] = 1
for any initial belief µ0 ∈ K. We invoke the following lemma, which we prove in Appendix A.5.1.
Lemma 11. Suppose that belief continuity holds. Consider Ω = {ω1, . . . , ωN} and suppose that
(i) δω1 satisfies the condition for local stability in Theorem 1;
(ii) ∆ ({ω2, . . . , ωN}) is unstable;
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(iii) for any mixed µ ∈ ∆(Ω), there is z ∈ supp(Pµ) with p̂µ(z|ω1) > p̂µ(z|ωn) for all n 6= 1.
Then δω1 is globally stable.
To prove Proposition 1, we verify the assumptions in Lemma 11. Assumptions (i) and (iii)
in Lemma 11 follow from assumptions (i) and (ii) in Proposition 1 applied with n = 1. Thus, it
remains to show that ∆({ω2, . . . , ωN}) is unstable. We prove inductively that ∆({ωN−m, . . . , ωN})
is unstable for all m = 0, . . . , N−2. For m = 0, this holds since δωN is unstable by assumption (i) in
Proposition 1 and Theorem 1. For the inductive step, we prove the following lemma; this completes
the proof, because assumptions (i)–(ii) in Proposition 1 imply assumptions (i)–(iii) in the lemma.
Lemma 12. Fix any n ∈ {2, . . . , N − 1}. Suppose that the set ∆({ωn+1, . . . , ωN}) is unstable
and belief continuity holds at some neighborhood of this set. Assume that (i) there exist q > 0
and a neighborhood Bn 3 δωn such that ωn 
q
µ ωk for all k > n and µ ∈ Bn \ {δωn}; (ii) δωn is
unstable; and (iii) for each mixed belief µ ∈ ∆({ωn, . . . , ωN}), there exists z ∈ supp(Pµ) such that
p̂µ(z|ωn) > p̂µ(z|ωk) for all k > n. Then ∆({ωn, . . . , ωN}) is unstable.
Proof. Note first that since ∆({ωn+1, . . . , ωN}) is unstable, there exists εn+1 > 0 such that ∆n+1 :=
{µ ∈ ∆(Ω) : µ({ωn+1, . . . , ωN}) ≥ 1 − εn+1} is transient. Moreover, we can assume that Bn in
assumption (i) takes the form {µ ∈ ∆(Ω) : µ(ωn) > 1 − κ} for some κ > 0, where, by choosing κ
sufficiently small, assumption (ii) ensures that Bn is transient.
We claim that we can choose ε > 0, γ ∈ (0, 1), and εn ∈ (0, εn+1) such that, defining








the following three properties are satisfied:
B′n ⊆ Bn (15)




− 1 ≥ γ for all k > n (16)
εn+1
εn+1 − εn
≤ 1 + γ. (17)








≤ ε. Then (15) is satisfied for all sufficiently small εn ∈ (0, εn+1). To
show (16), note that by assumption (iii) and continuity of signal densities in z, for all µ ∈
∆({ωn, . . . , ωN})\{δωn , . . . , δωN}, there exists Zµ ⊆ Z with Pµ(Zµ) > 0 and infz∈Zµ
p̂µ(z|ωn)
p̂µ(z|ωk) −1 > 0
for all k > n. By belief continuity, for each such µ, there exists an open neighborhood Bµ 3 µ
such that infµ′∈Bµ Pµ′(Zµ) > 0 and infz∈Zµ,µ′∈Bµ
p̂µ′ (z|ωn)
p̂µ′ (z|ωk) − 1 > 0 for all k > n. Moreover, given
ε > 0, but independent of the choice of εn, µ(ωn), . . . , µ(ωN ) are bounded away from 1 for all
µ ∈ ∆({ωn, . . . , ωN}) \ (∆n+1 ∪ B′n). Thus, ∆({ωn, . . . , ωN}) \ (∆n+1 ∪ B′n) is contained in some
compact set K ⊂ ∆({ωn, . . . , ωN}) \ {δωn , . . . , δωN}. Hence, by taking a finite subcover (Bµi)i=1,...,I
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of K, there is γ ∈ (0, 1) such that infµ′∈Bµi Pµ′(Zµi) ≥ γ and infz∈Zµi ,µ′∈Bµi
p̂µ′ (z|ωn)
p̂µ′ (z|ωk) − 1 ≥ γ for all
k > n and i ∈ 1, . . . , I. For all small enough εn, we can then ensure that (16) and (17) hold, where
the former is guaranteed by requiring ∆n \ (∆n+1 ∪B′n) to be included in the cover (Bµi)i=1,...,I .
For ε, γ, and εn as chosen above, we establish the following two claims:
Claim 1: There exists T ∈ N such that Pµ0 [∃t ≤ T s.t. µt ∈ B′n ∪∆cn] ≥ γT for every initial belief
µ0 ∈ ∆n \∆n+1.
Proof of Claim 1. Observe first that µ0(ωn+1)µ0(ωn) , . . . ,
µ0(ωN )
µ0(ωn)
are uniformly bounded from above for all









Starting with any initial belief µ0 ∈ ∆n \ ∆n+1, we recursively construct sequences of signal
realizations z0, z1, . . . , zT ′ with T ′ ≤ T − 1 and corresponding updated beliefs µ1, µ2, . . . , µT ′+1.
Suppose we have constructed z0, . . . , zt−1 for some t ∈ {0, . . . , T}. We distinguish two cases:
(a) If µt ∈ B′n ∪∆cn, set T ′ = t− 1 and terminate the construction of the signal sequence.
(b) Suppose µt ∈ ∆n\(∆n+1∪B′n). Then by (16), we can pick any signal zt ∈ Zµt , which satisfies
p̂µt (zt|ωn)
p̂µt (zt|ωk)
−1 ≥ γ for all k > n. We claim that the updated belief µt+1 satisfies µt+1({ωn+1, . . . , ωN}) ≤
µt({ωn+1, . . . , ωN}), so µt+1 6∈ ∆n+1. Indeed, suppose to the contrary that µt+1({ωn+1, . . . , ωN}) >
µt({ωn+1, . . . , ωN}). By choice of zt, we have µt+1(ωn)µt+1(ωk) ≥
µt(ωn)
µt(ωk)
(1 + γ) for each k > n. Thus,
µt+1(ωn)
µt(ωn)
≥ maxk>n µt+1(ωk)µt(ωk) (1 + γ) ≥
µt+1({ωn+1,...,ωN})
µt({ωn+1,...,ωN}) (1 + γ) > 1 + γ. At the same time,
µt+1(ωn)
µt(ωn)
≤ 1− µt+1({ωn+1, . . . , ωN})
1− µt({ωn+1, . . . , ωN})− εn
<
1− µt({ωn+1, . . . , ωN})
1− µt({ωn+1, . . . , ωN})− εn
≤ εn+1
εn+1 − εn
where the first inequality holds because µt ∈ ∆n and the third because µt 6∈ ∆n+1. Thus, εn+1εn+1−εn ≥
µt+1(ωn)
µt(ωn)
> 1 + γ, which contradicts (17).
Note that the construction above ensures that case (a) must occur at the latest at t = T ,














≤ ε by (b) and the choice of T . This proves Claim 1, as by construction
and (16), signal realizations (z0, . . . , zT ′) of the above form occur with probability at least γT
′+1.
Claim 2: Let τ := inf{t : µt 6∈ B′n}. There exists ξ ∈ [0, 1) such that Pµ0 [τ < ∞] = 1 and
Pµ0 [µτ ∈ ∆n \B′n] ≤ ξ for every initial belief µ0 ∈ B′n.
Proof of Claim 2. Note that Pµ0 [τ < ∞] = 1 is immediate from (15) and the fact that Bn is







. By (15) and assumption
(ii), `t is a nonnegative supermartingale, and in particular Eµ0 [`1] < `0 ≤ ε for every initial belief
µ0 ∈ B′n. Since Eµ0 [`1] is continuous in µ0 by Lemma 9 and B′n is compact, there exists ξ ∈ [0, 1)
such that Eµ0 [`1] ≤ ξε holds for every initial belief µ0 ∈ B′n. Hence,
Pµ0 [µτ ∈ ∆n \B′n]ε+ Pµ0 [µτ 6∈ ∆n \B′n] · 0 ≤ Eµ0 [`τ ] ≤ Eµ0 [`1] ≤ ξε,
where the first inequality holds by definition of B′n. Thus, Pµ0 [µτ ∈ ∆n \B′n] ≤ ξ.
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To complete the proof of Lemma 12, for each initial belief µ0, define g(µ0) := Pµ0 [µt ∈ ∆n∀t].
We verify that supµ0∈∆n g(µ0) = 0. First, take any µ0 ∈ ∆n∩∆n+1 and set τ
′ := inf{t : µt 6∈ ∆n+1},
which satisfies Pµ0 [τ ′ <∞] = 1 since ∆n+1 is transient. By the Markov property,









Next, take any µ0 ∈ B′n and define τ := inf{t : µt 6∈ B′n} as in Claim 2. By the Markov property,
g(µ0) = Pµ0 [µτ ∈ ∆n]Eµ0 [g(µτ )|µτ ∈ ∆n] ≤ ξ sup
µ∈∆n
g(µ) = ξ sup
µ∈∆n\∆n+1
g(µ)
where the inequality holds by Claim 2 and the equality by (18). Thus,
sup
µ∈Bn
g(µ) ≤ ξ sup
µ∈∆n\∆n+1
g(µ). (19)
Last, take µ0 ∈ ∆n\∆n+1 and let τ ′′ := inf{min{t : µt ∈ ∆cn∪B′n}, T+1}. By the Markov property,
g(µ0) = Pµ0 [τ ′′ ≤ T ]Eµ0 [g(µτ )|τ ′′ ≤ T ] + Pµ0 [τ ′′ > T ]Eµ0 [g(µτ )|τ ′′ > T ]
≤ Pµ0 [τ ′′ ≤ T ] sup
µ∈Bn





g(µ) + (1− γT ) sup
µ∈∆n
g(µ) ≤ (γT ξ + 1− γT ) sup
µ∈∆n\∆n+1
g(µ),
where the second inequality follows from Claim 1 and the fact that supµ∈Bn g(µ) ≤ supµ∈∆n g(µ)
by (19), and the final inequality holds by (18)–(19). Thus, supµ∈∆n\∆n+1 g(µ) = 0 and the desired
conclusion follows from (18).
A.5.1 Proof of Lemma 11
Fix any γ ∈ (0, 1). Given assumption (i), Claims 1 and 2 in the proof of Theorem 1 ensure that
there exist neighborhoods B1 ⊇ B′1 3 δω1 such that
Pµ0 [µt ∈ B1∀t] = Pµ0 [µt ∈ B1∀t, and µt → δω1 ] ≥ γ for all initial beliefs µ0 ∈ B′1. (20)
By assumption (ii), ∆({ω2, . . . , ωN}) admits a neighborhood ∆2 such that Pµ0 [∃t s.t. µt /∈ ∆2] =
1 for all initial beliefs µ0 ∈ ∆2 \ ∆({ω2, . . . , ωN}). Since, initial beliefs have full support, we
equivalently have that Pµ0 [∃t s.t. µt /∈ ∆2] = 1 for all initial beliefs µ0 ∈ ∆2. Thus, ∆2 is transient.
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Observe that there exist T ∈ N and η > 0 such that, for every initial belief µ0 6∈ ∆2,
Pµ0 [∃t ≤ T s.t. µt ∈ B′1] ≥ η (21)
Indeed, pick L > 1 large enough that (i) µ ∈ B′1 for all µ with log
µ(ω1)
µ(ωn)
≥ L for each n > 1, and (ii)
log µ(ω1)µ(ωn) ≥ 1/L for all µ 6∈ ∆2 and n > 1. By continuity of pµ(z), p̂µ(z|·) in (z, µ) and assumption
(iii), there exists ε > 0 such that for all µ in the compact set {µ ∈ ∆(Ω) : L ≥ minn>1 log µ(ω1)µ(ωn) ≥
1/L}, there is Zµ ⊆ Z such that Pµ(Zµ) > ε and log p̂µ(z|ω1)p̂µ(z|ωn) > ε for all n 6= 1 and z ∈ Zµ. Starting
from any initial belief µ0 6∈ ∆2, consider any realization of signals (zt) and corresponding beliefs (µt)
such that zt ∈ Zµt . This ensures log
µt(ω1)
µt(ωn)
≥ 1/L + tε for each n > 1 and t. Along this sequence,
µt′ ∈ B′1 for some t′ ≤
L−1/L
ε . Thus, claim (21) holds by choosing T ≥
L−1/L
ε and η = ε
T .
For each initial belief µ0, define h(µ0) := Pµ0 [µt → δω1 ]. To show global stability of δω1 , we
will prove that infµ∈∆◦(Ω) h(µ) = 1. Note first that for any initial belief µ0, τ := inf{t : µt 6∈ ∆2}
satisfies Pµ0 [τ <∞] = 1 as ∆2 is transient. Thus, by the Markov property of µt, we have h(µ0) =






Next, take any initial belief µ0 ∈ B′1 and τ ′ := inf{t : µt 6∈ B1}. By the Markov property and (20),
h(µ0) = Pµ0 [τ ′ =∞]Pµ0 [µt → δω1 |τ ′ =∞] + Pµ0 [τ ′ <∞]Eµ0 [h(µτ ′)|τ ′ <∞]
= Pµ0 [τ ′ =∞] + Pµ0 [τ ′ <∞]Eµ0 [h(µτ ′)|τ ′ <∞] ≥ γ + (1− γ) inf
µ∈∆◦(Ω)
h(µ).
Combining this with (22) yields
inf
µ∈B′1
h(µ) ≥ γ + (1− γ) inf
µ∈∆◦(Ω)\∆2
h(µ). (23)
Finally, consider any initial belief µ0 6∈ ∆2 and let τ ′′ := min{inf{t : µt ∈ B′1}, T + 1}. Then,
by the Markov property and (21)-(23), we have
h(µ0) = Pµ0 [τ ′′ ≤ T ]Eµ0 [h(µτ ′′)|τ ′′ ≤ T ] + Pµ0 [τ ′′ > T ]Eµ0 [h(µτ ′′)|τ ′′ > T ]
≥ Pµ0 [τ ′′ ≤ T ] inf
µ∈B′1





h(µ) + (1− η) inf
µ∈∆◦(Ω)
h(µ) ≥ ηγ + (1− ηγ) inf
µ∈∆◦(Ω)\∆2
h(µ).
This holds for all µ0 6∈ ∆2, so infµ∈∆◦(Ω)\∆2 h(µ) = 1. By (22), infµ∈∆◦(Ω) h(µ) = 1.
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B General states
We provide local and global stability conditions for infinite state spaces, by extending the martingale
approach in the main text. Assume Ω is a compact metric space and endow ∆(Ω) with the Prokhorov
metric d. In addition to Assumption 1, we impose the following standard assumption, which is
automatically satisfied if Ω is finite:
Assumption 2 (Continuity in states). For each µ ∈ ∆(Ω) and z ∈ Z, p̂µ(z|ω) is continuous in ω.
As in Section 3, given any full-support initial belief µ0, the belief process µt is induced by (Pµ)
and (P̂µ(·|ω)) using Bayes’ rule. In particular, after signal zt is drawn according to pµt , µt is updated
to µt+1 by setting µt+1(Ω′) =
´
Ω′ p̂µt (zt|ω) dµt(ω)´
Ω
p̂µt (zt|ω) dµt(ω)
for each measurable Ω′ ⊆ Ω.
B.1 Global iterated dominance
For global stability, we extend Theorem 2. For each nonempty Ω′ ⊆ Ω, let
S(Ω′) := {ω ∈ Ω′ :6 ∃ω′ ∈ Ω′ s.t. ω′ KLµ ω for all µ ∈ ∆(Ω
′
)},
where Ω′ denotes the closure of Ω′ in Ω. Under belief continuity, S(Ω′) is nonempty and compact
(Lemma 14). Thus, S∞(Ω′) :=
⋂
k∈N S
k(Ω′) is nonempty and compact by Cantor’s intersection
theorem. The following result shows that Theorem 2 remains true unchanged:
Theorem 3. Assume belief continuity holds. Then ∆ (S∞(Ω)) is globally stable.
We prove Theorem 3 in Appendix B.4. All proofs in Appendix B rely on Lemma 15, which
extends our supermartingale construction via q-dominance to infinite state spaces.
B.2 Local iterated dominance
To obtain a condition for local stability, we also use the above iterated dominance approach. We
consider a set-valued notion of local stability: M ⊆ ∆(Ω) is a locally stable set if for any γ < 1,
there exists a neighborhood B of M such that Pµ0 [infν∈M d(µt, ν) → 0] ≥ γ from each initial
belief µ0 ∈ B. We also generalize the notion of strict BeNE to sets of beliefs: For each nonempty
measurable Ω′ ⊆ Ω, call ∆(Ω′) a strict BeNE set if for all ω 6∈ Ω′, there exists ω′ ∈ Ω′ such that
ω′ KLµ ω for all µ ∈ ∆(Ω
′
).
Note that if Ω′ = {ω′} is a singleton, this definition reduces to δω′ being a strict BeNE. We prove
the following result in Appendix B.5:
Theorem 4. Suppose Ω′ is open and belief continuity holds at some neighborhood of ∆(Ω′). If
∆(Ω′) is a strict BeNE set, then ∆(Sk(Ω′)) is locally stable for all k = 0, 1, . . . ,∞.
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Theorem 4 implies Corollary 1 when Ω is finite. However, a strict BeNE δω need not be locally
stable under general Ω, as {ω} need not be open.
Similar to the application of Theorem 3 in Section 5.1, Theorem 4 is straightforward to apply
under one-dimensional states, because in this case local iterated dominance again corresponds to
iterated application of the map m:
Example 5. Consider the environment in Section 5.1. Proposition 5 (Online Appendix C.1) gen-
eralizes Proposition 2 by showing that if Ω′ ⊆ Ω is an open interval such that m(Ω′) ⊆ Ω′, then
Sk(Ω′) = mk(Ω
′
) for all k = 0, 1, . . . ,∞. For any such Ω′, the fact that S(Ω′) = m(Ω′) ⊆ Ω′ implies
that Ω′ is a strict BeNE set. Thus, by Theorem 4, ∆(m∞(Ω′)) is locally stable.
For example, consider any BeNE δω̂. Then if m is continuously differentiable near ω̂ with
|m′(ω̂)| < 1, this implies that δω̂ is locally stable, because for some small enough open interval
Ω′ 3 ω̂, we have m(Ω′) ⊆ Ω′ and m∞(Ω′) = {ω̂}. N
B.3 Preliminary results for the proofs of Theorems 3–4





continuous in ω and ω̃.
Proof. For all z such that pµ(z) > 0,
p̂µ(z|ω)
p̂µ(z|ω̃) is continuous in ω, ω̃ by Assumptions 1.1 and 2. Thus,´ ( p̂µ(z|ω)
p̂µ(z|ω̃)
)q






dominated by `(·)q, which is Pµ-integrable by Assumption 1.2.
Lemma 14. Take any nonempty Ω′ ⊆ Ω such that belief continuity holds at ∆(Ω′). Then S(Ω′) is
nonempty and compact.
Proof. Take any ω ∈ Ω′ \ S(Ω′). Then, by definition of S(Ω′), there is φ(ω) ∈ Ω′ such that´
log p̂µ(z|ω)p̂µ(z|φ(ω)) dPµ(z) < 0 for each µ ∈ ∆(Ω
′
). Thus, for each µ ∈ ∆(Ω′), Lemma 2 yields qµ ∈ (0, q∗]





pµ(z) dν(z) < 1.
By belief continuity, the LHS is continuous in µ at ∆(Ω′) (Lemma 9). Thus,




1 for all µ′ in some neighborhood Bµ of µ. Since ∆(Ω
′
) is compact, by taking a finite subcover of
{Bµ : µ ∈ ∆(Ω
′







pµ(z) dν(z) < 1. (24)
Since the LHS of (24) is continuous in ω′ by Lemma 13 and the maximum theorem, there is a





pµ(z) dν(z) < 1. By
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Lemma 2, this implies φ(ω) KLµ ω′ for all µ ∈ ∆(Ω
′
) and ω′ ∈ Bω ∩Ω
′. Thus, Ω′ \ S(Ω′) is open in
Ω
′, which implies that S(Ω′) is closed in Ω′ and hence compact.
Next, suppose that S(Ω′) is empty. Then the above observation shows that for each ω ∈ Ω′,
there exists φ(ω) ∈ Ω′ and a neighborhood Bω of ω such that φ(ω) KLµ ω′ for all µ ∈ ∆(Ω
′
) and
ω′ ∈ Bω ∩ Ω
′. By compactness of Ω′, {Bω : ω ∈ Ω
′} admits a finite subcover {Bωi : i = 1, . . . , I}.
Then for each i ∈ {1, . . . , I}, there exists j ∈ {1, . . . , I} such that φ(ωj) KLµ φ(ωi) for all µ ∈ ∆(Ω
′
).
By transitivity of KL dominance, this yields i ∈ {1, . . . , I} such that φ(ωi) KLµ φ(ωi), which is
impossible. Thus, S(Ω′) is nonempty.
The following lemma extends the supermartingale construction via q-dominance to general Ω.
For any M ⊆ ∆(Ω) and ε > 0, let Bε(M) := {ν ∈ ∆(Ω) : infµ∈M d(µ, ν) < ε}. Note that (25)





with τ := inf{s : µs 6∈ Bε(D)} is a nonnegative
supermartingale. Moreover, the lemma shows that `it → 0 a.s. conditional on τ =∞.
Lemma 15. Suppose belief continuity holds at a neighborhood of some nonempty compact set D ⊆
∆(Ω). Let Ω′ ⊆ Ω be a compact set such that for any ω′ ∈ Ω′, there exists ω ∈ Ω with ω KLµ ω′ for
all µ ∈ D. Then there exist a family of measurable sets of states {Ai}Ii=1, a family of open sets of










dPµ(z) ≤ 1− ε (25)
for each i and µ ∈ Bε(D) with µ(Ai), µ(A′i) > 0. Moreover, for any initial belief µ0,
Pµ0 [µt(Ω′)→ 0, µt ∈ Bε(D) ∀t] = Pµ0 [µt ∈ Bε(D) ∀t]. (26)





pµ(z) dν(z) < 0. (27)





pµ(z) dν(z) ≤ 1− ζω. (28)





pµ(z) dν(z) < 1
for all q ∈ (0, qω,µ]. By belief continuity, the LHS is continuous in µ in a neighborhood of D
(Lemma 9). Thus,
´ ( p̂µ′ (z|ω)
p̂µ′ (z|φ(ω))
)qω,µ
pµ′(z) dν(z) < 1 for all µ′ in some neighborhood Bµ of µ.
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Since D is compact, by taking a finite subcover of {Bµ : µ ∈ D}, we can choose qω,µ =: qω to be
independent of µ. Since the subcover of D is open, (28) holds for ζω > 0 sufficiently small.
Claim 2: For each ω ∈ Ω′, there exists εω > 0 such that, for any µ ∈ Bζω(D) with µ(Bεω(ω) ∩
Ω′), µ(Bεω(φ(ω))) > 0, we have
ˆ (´
Bεω (ω)∩Ω′




pµ(z) dν(z) ≤ 1− ζω/2. (29)













is continuous in µ̂, µ̂′,
since for each z, p̂µ(z|·) is continuous and bounded (by Assumption 2 and compactness of Ω). Thus,´ ( ´ p̂µ(z|ω′)dµ̂(ω′)´
p̂µ(z|ω′)dµ̂′(ω′)
)qω




is dominated by `(·)qω . Therefore, by (28), there exists εω,µ > 0 such that (30)
is strictly less than 1− ζω/2 for all ε ∈ (0, εω,µ].
Moreover (30) is continuous in µ by the maximum theorem, as




is continuous in µ by belief continuity (using the same argument as in Lemma 9). Therefore,
maxµ̂∈∆(Bεω,µ (ω)),µ̂′∈∆(Bεω,µ (φ(ω)))
´ ( ´ p̂µ′ (z|ω′)dµ̂(ω′)´
p̂µ′ (z|ω′)dµ̂′(ω′)
)qω
pµ′(z) dν(z) < 1 − ζω/2 for all µ′ in some
neighborhood Bµ of µ. Since Bζω(D) is compact, by taking a finite subcover of {Bµ : µ ∈ Bζω(D)},
we can choose εω,µ =: εω to be independent of µ. This establishes (29).
Since {Bεω(ω)∩Ω′ : ω ∈ Ω′} covers the compact set Ω′, there is a finite subcover {Bεωi (ωi)∩Ω
′ :
i = 1, . . . , I}. Thus by setting Ai := Bεωi (ωi) ∩ Ω
′, A′i := Bεωi (φ(ωi)), qi := qωi for each i, and
ε := mini min{εωi , ζωi/2}, we obtain (25) for each i and any µ ∈ Bε(D) with µ(Ai), µ(A′i) > 0.





for each i = 1, . . . , I, where τ := inf{s :
µs 6∈ Bε(D)}. For any initial belief µ0, `it is a nonnegative supermartingale by (25). Thus, Doob’s
convergence theorem yields an L∞ random variable `i∞ such that `it → `i∞ a.s. Observe that, for
any initial belief µ0 ∈ Bε(D), Markov’s inequality and (25) imply






Thus, conditional on any µt ∈ Bε(D), the probability that `it+1 is less than (1 − ε/2)`it is at least
ε/2
1−ε/2 . This implies that Pµ0 [`
i
∞ > 0, τ =∞] = 0 for any initial belief. Since, conditional on τ =∞,
we have `it =
µt(Ai)
µt(A′i)
for each i and t, this ensures the desired claim.
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B.4 Proof of Theorem 3
Call M ⊆ ∆(Ω) Lyapunov stable if for any neighborhood B of M and γ < 1, there exists a
neighborhood B′ of M such that Pµ0 [µt ∈ B ∀t] ≥ γ for every initial belief µ0 ∈ B′. We start with
a preliminary lemma:
Lemma 16. Let Ω′ ⊆ Ω be a nonempty and measurable set such that ∆(Ω′) is Lyapunov stable and
belief continuity holds at a neighborhood of ∆(Ω′). Then ∆(S(Ω′)) is Lyapunov stable.
Proof. Write Ω′′ := S(Ω′), which is nonempty and compact by Lemma 14. If Ω′′ = Ω′, the claim
is immediate, so assume Ω′′ ( Ω′. Take any neighborhood B of ∆(Ω′′) and any γ < 1. Pick N
large enough that ∆(B1/N (Ω′′)) ⊆ B. By Lemma 15, there exist a family of measurable sets of
states {Ai}Ii=1, a family of open sets of states {A′i}Ii=1, ε > 0, and qi > 0 for each i such that⋃
iAi = Ω
′ \B1/N (Ω′′) and (25) holds for each i and µ ∈ Bε(∆(Ω
′
)) with µ(Ai), µ(A′i) > 0.









≤ ε′}, where by construction of {Ai}Ii=1, we can






is a nonnegative supermartingale by (25), and thus a.s. converges to an
L∞ limit `i∞.







, µ(Ω\Ω′) ≤ η}, which is a neighborhood
of ∆(Ω′′). For any initial belief µ0 ∈ C ′η, we have









> ε′, µs ∈ Bε′(∆(Ω
′
))∀s ≤ t].
By Lyapunov stability of ∆(Ω′), we can pick η sufficiently small that the first term is less than 1−γ2















t is a nonnegative supermartingale.
Thus, by taking η sufficiently small, Pµ0 [µt ∈ B∀t] ≥ Pµ0 [µt ∈ C∀t] ≥ γ for every initial belief
µ0 ∈ C ′η.
Proof of Theorem 3. Let Ωk := Sk(Ω) for k = 0, 1, . . ., which is a nested sequence of nonempty
compact sets (Lemma 14). We inductively show that Pµ0 [µt(Ωk) → 1] = 1 for all initial beliefs µ0
and every k ≥ 0. Case k = 0 is true by definition.
Suppose the claim is true for all k = 0, 1, . . . , κ − 1 and consider k = κ. Take any N with
Ω \ B1/N (Ωκ) nonempty. By Lemma 15 applied with Ω′ = Ω \ B1/N (Ωκ) and D = ∆(Ωκ−1), there
exists ε > 0 such that (26) holds for each initial belief µ0.
Take any γ < 1. Then by Lyapunov stability of ∆(Ωκ−1) (Lemma 16) there exists a neighbor-
hood B of ∆(Ωκ−1) such that Pµ0 [µt ∈ Bε(∆(Ωκ−1))∀t] ≥ γ for every initial belief µ0 ∈ B. Thus,
for any initial belief µ0, (26) and the inductive hypothesis that Pµ0 [µt(Ωκ−1)→ 1] = 1 imply
Pµ0 [µt(Ω \B1/N (Ωκ))→ 0] ≥ Pµ0 [∃t s.t. µt ∈ B]γ = γ.
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Since this holds for all γ < 1 and N large enough, we have
Pµ0 [µt(Ωκ)→ 1] = Pµ0 [µt(B1/N (Ωκ))→ 1∀N ] = 1,
for all initial beliefs µ0, completing the inductive step. Finally, for all initial beliefs µ0,
Pµ0 [µt(S∞(Ω))→ 1] = Pµ0 [µt(Ωk)→ 1∀k] = 1.
Thus, ∆(S∞(Ω)) is globally stable.
B.5 Proof of Theorem 4
Lemma 17. Suppose Ω′′ is open and belief continuity holds at some neighborhood of ∆(Ω′′). If
∆(Ω′′) is a strict BeNE set, then ∆(Ω′′) is locally stable and Lyapunov stable.
Proof. Based on the fact that ∆(Ω′′) is a strict BeNE set, we can apply Lemma 15 with Ω′ = Ω\Ω′′
and D = ∆(Ω′′). This yields measurable sets of states {Ai}Ii=1 with
⋃
iAi = Ω \ Ω′′, open sets of
states {A′i}Ii=1, ε > 0, and qi > 0 for each i such that (25) holds for each i and µ0 ∈ Bε(∆(Ω
′′
))
with µ(Ai), µ(A′i) > 0, and (26) holds for each initial belief µ0.
To show Lyapunov stability of ∆(Ω′′), take any γ < 1 and neighborhood B of ∆(Ω′′). Given
any η > 0, consider the neighborhood of ∆(Ω′′) of the form
Cη :=
{










Pick η+, η− > 0 small enough that Cη+ ⊆ B ∩Bε(∆(Ω′′)) and
η−
η+
≤ 1− γ. For any i and any initial





with τ := inf{s : µs 6∈ Cη+}, is a nonnegative supermartingale by
(25), so Doob’s convergence theorem yields an L∞ random variable `i∞ such that `it → `i∞ a.s. For
any initial belief µ0 ∈ Cη− ,
Pµ0 [∃t, µt 6∈ B] ≤ Pµ0 [
∑
i







where the second inequality uses Markov’s inequality and the third follows from Fatou’s lemma and
the fact that each `it is a nonnegative supermartingale. Thus, Pµ0 [µt ∈ B∀t] ≥ γ for all µ0 ∈ Cη− ,
proving that ∆(Ω′′) is Lyapunov stable.
To show that ∆(Ω′′) is locally stable, take any γ < 1. Since ∆(Ω′′) is Lyapunov stable, there
exists a neighborhood B of ∆(Ω′′) such that Pµ0 [µt ∈ Bε(∆(Ω′′)) ∀t] ≥ γ for any initial belief
µ0 ∈ B. Thus, (26) implies that for any initial belief µ0 in B,
Pµ0 [µt(Ω′′)→ 1] ≥ Pµ0 [µt(Ω′′)→ 1, µt ∈ Bε(∆(Ω′)) ∀t] ≥ γ,
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showing that ∆(Ω′′) is locally stable.
Proof of Theorem 4. For Ω′ as in the theorem, let Ωk := Sk(Ω′) for each k = 0, 1, . . . ,∞. Suppose
∆(Ω′) is a strict BeNE set. Then ∆(Ω′) is Lyapunov stable (Lemma 17), which combined with
Lemma 16 implies that ∆(Ωk) is Lyapunov stable for each k ∈ N.
Fix any γ < 1. By Lemma 17, ∆(Ω′) is locally stable. Thus, there exists a neighborhood B0 of
∆(Ω′) such that Pµ0 [µt(Ω′) → 1] ≥ γ for any initial belief µ0 ∈ B0. We show inductively that for
each k ∈ N, Pµ0 [µt(Ωk)→ 1] ≥ γ for any initial belief µ0 ∈ B0.
For k = 0, the claim is true by choice of B0. Thus, suppose the claim holds for k ≤ κ − 1 and
consider the case k = κ. Take any N > 0 such that Ω \ B1/N (Ωκ) is nonempty. By Lemma 15
applied with D = ∆(Ωκ−1), there exists ε > 0 such that for all initial beliefs µ0,
Pµ0 [µt(Ω \B1/N (Ωκ))→ 0, µt ∈ Bε(D) ∀t] = Pµ0 [µt ∈ Bε(D) ∀t]. (31)
Since ∆(Ωκ−1) is Lyapunov stable, for any η < 1, there exists a neighborhood C of ∆(Ωκ−1) such
that, for any initial belief µ0 ∈ C, Pµ0 [µt ∈ Bε(∆(Ωκ−1)) ∀t] ≥ η. Thus, for any initial belief
µ0 ∈ B0,
Pµ0 [µt(B1/N (Ωκ))→ 1] ≥ Pµ0 [∃t s.t. µt ∈ C]η ≥ γη,
where the first inequality uses (31) and the second uses the inductive hypothesis that Pµ0 [µt(Ωκ−1)→
1] ≥ γ. Since η can be chosen arbitrarily close to 1, Pµ0 [µt(B1/N (Ωκ)) → 1] ≥ γ. Since N can be
chosen arbitrarily large, this implies Pµ0 [µt(Ωκ) → 1] = Pµ0 [µt(B1/N (Ωκ)) → 1 ∀N ∈ N] ≥ γ, as
claimed.
This shows that ∆(Sk(Ω′)) is locally stable for all k ∈ N. Finally, to complete the proof, observe
that, for any initial belief µ0 ∈ B0,
Pµ0 [µt(S∞(Ω′))→ 1] = Pµ0 [µt(Ωk)→ 1 ∀k] ≥ γ.
Thus, ∆(S∞(Ω′)) is also locally stable.
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C Proofs for Section 5
C.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Consider the setting in Section 5.1. We prove a slight generalization of Proposition 2 that can also
be combined with Theorem 4 (Appendix B) to show local stability of δω̂:
Proposition 5. Take any compact interval interval Ω′ ⊆ Ω such that m(Ω′) ⊆ Ω′. Then Sk(Ω′) =
mk(Ω′) for all k = 0, 1, . . . ,∞. Moreover:
1. If m is increasing on Ω′, then S∞(Ω′) = {ω̂} iff ω̂ is the unique fixed point of m in Ω′.
2. If m is decreasing on Ω′, then S∞(Ω′) = {ω̂} iff ω̂ is the unique fixed point of m2 in Ω′.
Proof. For each ω, let a(ω) := a(δω). Since KL(Ga(·), Ĝa(·|ω)) is continuous in a and a(ω) is
continuous in ω, the map m is continuous. Take any compact interval Ω′ ⊆ Ω such that m(Ω′) ⊆
Ω′. We first show by induction that for all n = 0, 1, . . . ,∞, Sn(Ω′) = mn(Ω′) =: Ωn for some
sequence of compact intervals Ωn that is decreasing with respect to set inclusion. For n = 0,
S0(Ω′) := Ω′ =: m0(Ω′), so there is nothing to prove. Suppose the claim holds for all n ≤ k. We
show that S(Ωk) = m(Ωk).
To see that m(Ωk) ⊆ S(Ωk), take any ω ∈ m(Ωk). Then there is ω′ ∈ Ωk with ω KLδω′ ω
′′ for
all ω′′ ∈ Ω \ {ω}. Thus, there does not exist ω′′ ∈ Ω such that ω′′ KLµ ω for all µ ∈ ∆(Ωk) =
∆(Sk(Ω′)). Moreover, ω ∈ Ω′, as Ωk = Sk(Ω′) ⊆ Ω′ and m(Ω′) ⊆ Ω′ by assumption. This implies
ω ∈ Sk+1(Ω′) = S(Ωk).
To see that S(Ωk) ⊆ m(Ωk), take any ω ∈ Ωk \ m(Ωk). Since m is continuous and Ωk is
a compact interval, so is m(Ωk), say m(Ωk) = [ωk+1, ωk+1]. Thus, either (i) ω < ωk+1 or (ii)
ω > ωk+1. Consider case (i); a symmetric argument applies to case (ii). For any ω′′ ∈ Ωk, we
have ω < ωk+1 ≤ m(ω′′), which implies KL(Ga(ω′′), Ĝa(ω′′)(·|ω)) > KL(Ga(ω′′), Ĝa(ω′′)(·|ωk+1)) by
the strict quasi-convexity assumption on KL. Moreover, for any µ ∈ ∆(Ωk), the intermediate value
theorem yields ω′′ ∈ Ωk such that a(µ) = a(ω′′), as a(·) is FOSD-increasing and continuous. Thus,
for all µ ∈ ∆(Ωk), KL(Ga(µ), Ĝa(µ)(·|ω)) > KL(Ga(µ), Ĝa(µ)(·|ωk+1)), i.e., ωk+1 KLµ ω. Since
ωk+1 ∈ m(Ωk) ⊆ S(Ωk) by the previous paragraph, this shows ω 6∈ S(Ωk).
1





k(Ω′) =: m∞(Ω). Moreover, since the Ωk = [ωk, ωk] form a decreasing sequence of compact
intervals, S∞(Ω′) = [ω∞, ω∞] is nonempty, with ω∞ = limk ωk and ω∞ = limk ωk.
For the “moreover” part, supposem is increasing. Then Sk(Ω′) = [ωk, ωk] = [m(ωk−1),m(ωk−1)]
for all k ≥ 1. By continuity of m, this implies that ω∞ and ω∞ are fixed points of m in Ω′. Thus,
the “if” direction holds. For the “only if” direction, suppose ω∞ = ω∞ =: ω̂. Then for any fixed
point ω ∈ Ω′ of m, we have ω ∈ mk(Ω′) = Sk(Ω′) for all k ∈ N, so ω∞ ≤ ω ≤ ω∞, i.e., ω = ω̂.
Finally, suppose m is decreasing. Then Sk(Ω′) = [ωk, ωk] = [m2(ωk−2),m2(ωk−2)] for all k ≥ 2.
By continuity of m, this implies that ω∞ and ω∞ are fixed points of m2. Thus, the “if” direction
holds. For the “only if” direction, suppose ω∞ = ω∞ =: ω̂. Then for any fixed point ω ∈ Ω′ of m2,
we have ω ∈ mk(Ω′) = Sk(Ω′) for all even k ∈ N, so again ω∞ ≤ ω ≤ ω∞, i.e., ω = ω̂.
C.2 Details for the applications in Section 5.1
C.2.1 Effort choice under overconfidence
As in Heidhues, Kőszegi, and Strack (2018) (HKS), assume Q is twice continuously differentiable
with (i) Qaa < 0, and Qa(a, β, ω) > 0 > Qa(a, β, ω) for all (β, ω); (ii) Qβ, Qω > 0; (iii) Qaω > 0;
(iv) Qaβ ≤ 0; (v) |Qω| < κ for some constant κ > 0. Then standard arguments guarantee that
the optimal action a(µ) is continuous and FOSD-increasing. Moreover, if β̂ > β, any state ω > ω∗
is dominated by ω∗ at all beliefs, because 0 > Q(a, β, ω∗) − Q(a, β̂, ω∗) > Q(a, β, ω∗) − Q(a, β̂, ω)
for all a. Thus, m(ω) ≤ ω∗ for all ω. Hence, for all ω, Qa(a(ω), β, ω∗) − Qa(a(ω), β̂,m(ω)) ≥
Qa(a(ω), β, ω
∗)−Qa(a(ω), β̂, ω∗) > 0, which by (12) implies that m is increasing. HKS also assume
that m has a unique fixed point ω̂; their Proposition 1 shows that this obtains under several specific
functional forms Q, or if β̂ − β is sufficiently small, Qβ is bounded and Qω is bounded away from
0. Given this, Proposition 2 and Theorem 2 imply that δω̂ is globally stable.
C.2.2 Optimal stopping under the gambler’s fallacy
In He (2018), each period consists of a two-stage decision problem. In the first stage, output x1
follows N (m∗1, σ2). If the realized x1 is lower than the agent’s stopping threshold a, then second-
stage output x2 is observed, which follows N (m∗2, σ2). The agent knows the first-stage mean m∗1
and the variance σ2 in both stages, but is uncertain about the second-stage mean m2. Thus, the
state space Ω = [m2,m2] represents values of second-stage means, with true state ω∗ = m∗2.35
35He (2018) also considers the case in which the agent updates beliefs about both m1 and m2, assuming
that the state space Ω is a bounded parallelogram in R2 whose left and right edges are parallel to the y-axis
and whose top and bottom edges have slope −γ. In this case, any ω = (m1,m2) with m1 6= m∗1 is dominated
by ω′ := (m1 + d,m2 − γd) such that |m1 − m∗1| > |m1 + d − m∗| for some d. This is because ω′ yields
a lower KL-divergence for the first-stage, while it provides the same second-stage prediction as ω after any
realization of x1. Therefore, after one round of elimination, we can focus on the one-dimensional state space
that corresponds to values of m2.
2
While in reality there is no correlation between x1 and x2, the agent perceives negative correlation.
That is, her perceived distribution of x2 given m2 and conditional on period-1 realization x1 is
N (m2 − γ(x1 − m∗1), σ2), where γ ≥ 0 captures the extent of the agent’s bias. Given current
belief µ ∈ ∆(Ω), the agent chooses the threshold a ∈ R to maximize the expected value of u :
R × (R ∪ {∅}) → R, where u(x1, x2) denotes the utility when she draws (x1, x2), and u(x1, ∅)
denotes the utility when she only draws x1. Under the assumptions in He (2018), a(·) is continuous
and FOSD-increasing in µ.
This model maps to the setting in Section 5.1 by letting g(a) := ω∗ and ĝ(a, ω) := ω −
γ(E[x1|x1 ≤ a] − m∗1). By (12), m is increasing, as g′(a) −
∂ĝ
∂a(a, ω) = γ
∂E[x1|x1≤a]
∂a ≥ 0 for all
a. As He (2018) shows, there is a unique BeNE δω̂, where ω̂ < ω∗. Thus, Proposition 2 and
Theorem 2 imply that δω̂ is globally stable.
C.3 Preliminary results for Section 5.2
The following result shows that δω is globally stable whenever ω strictly q-dominates all other states
at all mixed beliefs.
Proposition 6. Consider any ω ∈ Ω. Suppose that belief continuity holds and for some q > 0, we
have ω %qµ ω′ for all ω′ 6= ω and all µ, with strict dominance for all mixed µ. Then δω is globally
stable.





is a nonnegative supermartingale
for each ω′ 6= ω, since ω %qµ ω′ for all µ. Thus, by Doob’s convergence theorem, there exists an L∞
random variable `∞(ω′) such that `t(ω′) → `∞(ω′) ≥ 0 a.s. Hence, the belief process µt converges
a.s. Let µ∞ denote the limit. Suppose for a contradiction that µ∞ 6= δω with positive probability,
which implies that for some ω′ 6= ω, `∞(ω′) > 0 with positive probability. Then there exists a
compact set K ⊆ ∆(Ω) with µ(ω), µ(ω′) > 0 for each µ ∈ K such that Pµ0 [∃τ s.t. µt ∈ K ∀t ≥
τ and ∃ limt µt(ω
′)
µt(ω)
] > 0. But for each µ ∈ K, we have ω qµ ω′, which implies that p̂µ(z|ω) > p̂µ(z|ω′)
for some z ∈ supp(Pµ). This yields a contradiction with Lemma 10.
A corollary of Proposition 6 is that if the true signal distribution coincides with the perceived
signal distribution at some state ω∗ (i.e., the environment is correctly specified), then δω∗ is globally
stable under an appropriate identification condition at mixed beliefs:
Corollary 2. Suppose belief continuity holds and for some ω∗ ∈ Ω, (i) Pµ(·) = P̂µ(·|ω∗) for all
µ ∈ ∆(Ω), and (ii) P̂µ(·|ω∗) 6= P̂µ(·|ω) for all ω 6= ω∗ and all mixed µ. Then δω∗ is globally stable.










= (P̂µ(suppPµ|ω))q ≤ 1, (32)
3
where the first inequality holds by Jensen’s inequality applied to the concave function xq. Since
Pµ(·) = P̂µ(·|ω∗) by (i), this shows ω∗ %qµ ω. Consider any mixed µ. If the second inequality in
(32) holds with equality, then (ii) ensures p̂µ(z|ω)pµ(z) 6=
p̂µ(z′|ω)
pµ(z′)
for some z, z′ ∈ suppPµ, in which case
the first inequality in (32) is strict. In either case, ω∗ qµ ω. Thus, the conclusion follows from
Proposition 6.
C.4 Proof of Lemma 4
Fix any q ∈ (0, 1) and true state ω∗ ∈ Ω. We will find ε > 0 such that learning is successful at ω∗
for any β̂ with |β̂ − β| < ε. This ensures the desired conclusion by finiteness of Ω. Consider any β̂.
Since C is constant and v is strictly convex, we have γβ̂(µ) = γ for all mixed µ. Thus, for each mixed
µ, the true and perceived probabilities of signal 1 satisfy pµ(1) = β+ γω∗ and p̂µ(1|ω) = β̂+ γω. If









where the value of the left-hand side is independent of µ. Hence, there exists ε > 0 such that for
any β̂ with |β̂ − β| < ε and any mixed µ and ω 6= ω∗, (33) continues to hold, so that ω∗ qµ ω.
Thus, for any β̂ with |β̂−β| < ε, Proposition 6 implies that δω∗ is globally stable in any state space
Ω′ ⊆ Ω with ω∗ ∈ Ω′, i.e., learning is successful at ω∗.
C.5 Proof of Lemma 5
Consider any strictly increasing cost function C. We will prove the following: Fix any β̂, ω ∈ Ω,
and γ̃ > 0. Then there exists a neighborhood B 3 δω such that γβ̂(µ) < γ̃ for all µ ∈ B.
At any belief µ, let Vµ(γ) denote the agent’s expected payoff to precision γ; that is,
Vµ(γ) =
(











where ω := (ω1, . . . , ωN )′ ∈ RN and µ(γ) and µ(γ) denote the posteriors updated from µ un-
der precision choice γ and perception β̂ following signals 1 and 0, respectively. By (2), γβ̂(µ) ∈
argmaxγ∈[0,γ] Vµ(γ)− C(γ) for all µ.
Since C is strictly increasing, C(γ̃) > C(0). Thus, by continuity of v, there exists a neighborhood





Note that Vµ(γ) is increasing in γ for all µ. Thus, it follows that (35) holds for each µ ∈ B and
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γ ∈ [0, γ]. This implies that for any γ ∈ [0, γ] and µ ∈ B,
Vµ(γ)− Vµ(0) ≤ |Vµ(γ)− v(δω)|+ |Vµ(0)− v(δω)| < C(γ̃)− C(0). (36)
Hence, for all γ ≥ γ̃ and µ ∈ B, we have
Vµ(γ)− C(γ) ≤ Vµ(γ)− C(γ̃) < Vµ(0)− C(0),
where the first inequality uses the fact that C is increasing and the second inequality uses (36).
Thus, for all µ ∈ B, we have γβ̂(µ) < γ̃, as claimed.
C.6 Proof of Proposition 3
Fix any true state ω∗ ∈ Ω and consider any β̂. The assumption that learning is successful at all
states if β̂ = β implies that for all mixed µ, we have γβ̂(µ) > 0. Now suppose that β < β̂; the
argument for β > β̂ is analogous.
Consider any ω ∈ Ω. By Lemma 5, there exists B 3 δω such that γβ̂(µ) <
β̂−β
ωN−ω1 for all µ ∈ B.
Consider any ω′, ω′′ ∈ Ω with ω′ < ω′′. Then, for any µ ∈ B \ {δω}, we have β + γβ̂(µ)ω
∗ <
β̂ + γβ̂(µ)ω
′ < β̂ + γβ̂(µ)ω
′′. By the same argument as in Example 4 (see footnote 20), this implies
that for all q ∈ (0, 1) and µ ∈ B \ {δω}, we have ω′ qµ ω′′. Note also that for each mixed µ,
γβ̂(µ) > 0 implies p̂µ(0|ω
′) > p̂µ(0|ω′′). Hence, Proposition 1 implies that δω1 is globally stable.
C.7 Proof of Lemma 6
Fix any β̂. We begin with some preliminary observations about the agent’s expected value Vµ(γ) of
precision γ at current belief µ, as given by (34). Note that the posteriors µ(γ) and µ(γ) of µ under
signal realizations 1 and 0, respectively, assign probabilities
µn(γ) =
µn(β̂ + γωn)




µn(1− β̂ − γωn)
1− β̂ − γµ · ω
,
to each state ωn. The first and second derivatives with respect to γ satisfy
µ′n(γ) = µn
β̂(ωn − µ · ω)




(1− β̂)(ωn − µ · ω)
(1− β̂ − γµ · ω)2
,
µ′′n(γ) = −2µnµ · ω
β̂(ωn − µ · ω)
(β̂ + γµ · ω)3
, µ′′
n
(γ) = −2µnµ · ω
(1− β̂)(ωn − µ · ω)
(1− β̂ − γµ · ω)3
.
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Thus, the marginal value of γ at µ satisfies























where ∂nv(µ) denotes the partial derivative of v with respect to the nth coordinate. Since µ(0) =
µ(0) = µ and β̂µ′n(0) + (1− β̂)µ′n(0) = 0 for each n, this yields
V ′µ(0) = 0. (37)
The second derivative satisfies







































Evaluating this at γ = 0 yields





∂2n,mv(µ)µn(ωn − µ · ω)µm(ωm − µ · ω). (38)
To prove Lemma 6, consider any twice continuously differentiable C with C ′(0) = C ′′(0) = 0.
For any mixed µ, we have V ′µ(0) = 0 = C ′(0) by (37), but V ′′µ (0) > 0 = C ′′(0) by (38) and the fact
that the Hessian of v is positive definite. Thus, by Taylor approximation,
Vµ(γ)− C(γ) > Vµ(0)− C(0)
for all sufficiently small γ > 0. Hence, for all mixed µ, γβ̂(µ) > 0, as required.
For the “moreover” part of Lemma 6, it is clear that (13) is necessary for learning to be successful
at all states ω∗ when β̂ = β. To see that (13) is sufficient, fix any true state ω∗ and suppose that
β̂ = β. Then Pµ(·) = P̂µ(·|ω∗) for all µ, and by (13), P̂µ(·|ω∗) 6= P̂µ(·|ω) for all ω 6= ω∗ and mixed
µ. Thus, by Corollary 2, δω∗ is globally stable at ω∗ in any state space Ω′ ⊆ Ω with ω∗ ∈ Ω′. Hence,
learning is successful at ω∗.
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C.8 Proof of Lemma 7
Consider any true state ω∗ ∈ Ω. Since F = F̂ , we have Pµ(·) = P̂µ(·|ω∗) for all µ. Moreover, for any
mixed µ, the monotone likelihood ratio assumption on private signals ensures that µ
s(ω)
µs(ω′) is strictly
increasing in s for any states ω > ω′ in supp(µ), which implies that θ∗(µs) is strictly decreasing
in s. Thus, for all mixed µ, p̂µ(0|ω) =
´
F̂ (θ∗(µs))φ(s|ω) ds is strictly decreasing in ω, so that
P̂µ(·|ω) 6= P̂µ(·|ω∗) for all ω 6= ω∗. Hence, by Corollary 2, δω∗ is globally stable at ω∗ in every state
space Ω′ ⊆ Ω with ω∗ ∈ Ω′. This shows that learning is successful at ω∗.
C.9 Proof of Lemma 8
Let Φ(·|ω) denote the cumulative distribution function of private signals conditional on ω. Since δsω =
δω for each ω and s, the bounded convergence theorem implies that limµ→δω
´
F̂ (θ∗(µs))dΦ(s|ω′) =
F̂ (θ∗ω) for each ω, ω′, as claimed.
C.10 Proof of Proposition 4
We will invoke the following lemma:
Lemma 18. Fix any true state ω∗ ∈ Ω, q ∈ (0, 1), and n ∈ {1, . . . , N}. If F (θ∗n) > F̂ (θ∗n), then
there exists a neighborhood Bn 3 δωn such that ω` 
q
µ ωk for all `, k with ` < k and all mixed
µ ∈ Bn. If F (θ∗n) < F̂ (θ∗n), then there exists a neighborhood Bn 3 δωn such that ωk 
q
µ ω` for all `,
k with ` < k and all mixed µ ∈ Bn.
Proof. Suppose F (θ∗n) > F̂ (θ∗n); the argument when F (θ∗n) < F̂ (θ∗n) is analogous. By Lemma 8,
there exists a neighborhoodBn 3 δωn such that for all µ ∈ Bn and ω′, we have |pµ(0)−F (θ∗n)|, |p̂µ(0|ω′)−
F̂ (θ∗n)| <
F (θ∗n)−F̂ (θ∗n)
2 . Hence, pµ(0) > p̂µ(0|ω
′) for all µ ∈ Bn and ω′. Consider any `, k with ` < k.
By the monotone likelihood ratio assumption on private signals, p̂µ(0|ωk) < p̂µ(0|ω`) for all mixed µ.
Thus, for any mixed µ ∈ Bn, pµ(0) > p̂µ(0|ω`) > p̂µ(0|ωk). By the same argument as in Example 4
(see footnote 20), this implies that for all q ∈ (0, 1) and mixed µ ∈ Bn, ω` qµ ωk, as claimed.
We now prove Proposition 4. Fix any q ∈ (0, 1). For the first part, note that if F (θ∗N ) < F̂ (θ∗N ),
then Lemma 18 yields some neighborhood B 3 δωN such that ωN 
q
µ ωk for all k 6= N and mixed
µ ∈ B, while if F (θ∗N ) > F̂ (θ∗N ), then Lemma 18 yields a neighborhood B 3 δωN such that ω1 
q
µ ωN
for all mixed µ ∈ B. Thus, by Theorem 1, δωN is locally stable in the former case and unstable
in the latter. Finally, if F (θ∗n) < F̂ (θ∗n) for each n, then Lemma 18 implies that for each n, there
is a neighborhood Bn 3 δωn such that ωk 
q
µ ω` for all ` > k and mixed µ ∈ Bn. Moreover,
p̂µ(1|ω) is strictly increasing in ω by the monotone likelihood ratio assumption on private signals
and the monotonicity of utilities. Hence, up to reversing indices of states, Proposition 1 implies δωN
is globally stable. The arguments for the second part are analogous.
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Finally, for the third part, note that if F (θ∗n) 6= F̂ (θ∗n), then Lemma 18 implies that for some
neighborhood Bn 3 δωn , we either have ω1 
q
µ ωn for all mixed µ ∈ Bn or ωN qµ ωn for all mixed
µ ∈ Bn. In either case, δωn is unstable by Theorem 1, as claimed.
D Additional results
D.1 A derivative condition for Theorem 1
Under slow learning, we provide a way to verify the conditions in Theorem 1 by only considering
the derivatives of the difference in KL-prediction accuracy at the belief δω. Let ∆(Ω) − ∆(Ω) :=
{ν1 − ν2 : ν1, ν2 ∈ ∆(Ω) ⊆ R|Ω|}. Denote by ∇mg(µ) the directional derivative of g : ∆(Ω)→ R at
µ in the direction of m ∈ ∆(Ω)−∆(Ω) whenever this is well-defined.
Corollary 3. Assume slow learning holds. Suppose that, at µ = δω, pµ(z) and
p̂µ(z|ω′)
p̂µ(z|ω) admit
ν-integrable directional derivatives for each ω′ 6= ω and ν-almost all z.




p̂µ(z|ω) dPµ(z) < 0 for every ω
′, ω′′ 6= ω, then condition
(8) in Theorem 1 holds, so δω is locally stable.




p̂µ(z|ω) dPµ(z) > 0 for some ω
′ and every ω′′ 6= ω, then
condition (9) in Theorem 1 holds, so δω is unstable.





0 at µ = δω. The first condition ensures that for all µ close enough to δω, KL(Pµ, P̂µ(·|ω)) −
KL(Pµ, P̂µ(·|ω′)) < 0, i.e., ω KLµ ω′, and that this difference has a first-order magnitude as µ ≈ δω.
Proof. We only prove the first part; the second part is analogous. Fix any ω′ 6= ω. Since Ω is finite,
it suffices to find a neighborhood B 3 δω and q > 0 such that ω qµ ω′ for all µ ∈ B \ {δω}.

























As q → 0, this converges to
∇mγ(µ) =
ˆ (

















This implies that there exists a neighborhood B 3 δω such that for all µ ∈ B \ {δω},
γq(µ) < γq(δω) = 0,
where the equality holds by slow learning. Thus, ω qµ ω′ for all µ ∈ B \ {δω}, as desired.
D.2 Details for Remark 2
The following example shows that one cannot replace q-dominance with KL-dominance in the local
stability condition in Theorem 1. That is, condition (10) in Remark 2 does not ensure that δω is
locally stable:




















x−1 for all x ≥ 1, f(x) >
1
2
for all x < 1, and limx→−∞ f(x) = 1/2. Note that limx→+∞ f(x) = 1/2, whence belief continuity
























− 1 > 0,
so ω KLµ ω′. Thus, condition (10) is satisfied.



















log µt(ω)µt(ω′) − 1 =
√
log µt(ω)µt(ω′) otherwise.
Thus, by Doob’s convergence theorem, there is an L∞ random variable `∞ such that `t → `∞ a.s.
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Since, by construction,
∣∣∣log µt+1(ω)µt+1(ω′) − log µt(ω)µt(ω′) ∣∣∣ = 1 for all t along all paths of signal realizations,
there is probability zero that µt converges to a mixed belief. Thus, τ < ∞ a.s. Hence, there a.s.
exists some t such that log µt(ω)µt(ω′) < 1. This implies that δω is unstable. N
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